XXVth Bled Philosophical Conference

EPISTEMIC VIRTUES AND EPISTEMIC SKILLS

Epistemske vrline in epistemske veščine

June 5th - 9th 2017
Bled, Slovenia
Hotel Kompas

Organizers:

Sarah Wright (University of Georgia)
Smiljana Gartner (University of Maribor)
Nenad Miščevič (University of Maribor)
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The conference is officially included in the program of the activities of the Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy and is sponsored by the
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor
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Booklet with abstracts for all talks can be found on-line at
http://bledconference.splet.arnes.si/files/2017/06/Bled-2017-net.pdf

History. Philosophical conferences at Bled (Slovenia) were initiated, on the suggestion by John Biro, in 1993, at first as a continuation of the IUC-Dubrovnik postgraduate course in philosophy but they gradually started a life of their own, with the help, first of Eugene Mills and then Mylan Engel, Jr. They typically take place during the first week of June and are dedicated to various topics in analytic philosophy. Past conference topics have included philosophy of mind, metaphysics, truth, modality, vagueness, rationality, contextualism, ethics, particularism, political philosophy, epistemic virtue, freedom and determinism, knowledge, and group epistemology.

PROGRAM

## Monday, June 5th

<u>9:00 Welcoming Remarks</u>

	Triglavska	*Grajska*
9:15-10:15	**The Gettier Mistake** John Biro University of Florida	**Responsibilist Epistemic Virtues as Skills** Sarah Wright University of Georgia
10:20-11:20	**Merely Partial Definition and the Analysis of Knowledge** Samuel Elgin Yale University	**Epistemic Virtues as Epistemic Skills – a Lack of Character and Agency?** Matt Stichter Washington State University
11:20-11:40	break	
11:40-12:40	**Knowledge need not be the Product of Virtue** Simon Rippon Central European University	**Virtuous Epistemic Agency** Terry Horgan University of Arizona Matjaž Potrč University of Ljubljana
12:40-2:35	lunch	
2:35-3:35	**The Modal Dimensions of Skillfulness and Knowledge** Bob Beddor (with Carlotta Pavese) National University of Singapore	**Revisiting the Question: Emotion-Judgment Conflicts and Rational Revision** Kelly Epley University of Oklahoma
3:35-3:55	break	
3:55-4:55	**Unethical Knowledge, Practicalism and Intellectualism** Nicholas Shackel Cardiff University	**Hope and the Virtue of Creative Resolve** Nicole Hassoun Binghamton University
5:00-6:00	**Three Types of Belief on Authority** Katherine Dormandy University of Innsbruck	**Phenomenal Commitments: A Puzzle for Experiential Theories of Emotion** Jona Vance Northern Arizona University

Tuesday, June 6th

	Triglavska	*Grajska*
9:00-10:00	**Implicit Bias and Qualiefs** Martina Fürst University of Graz	**Intellectual Humility and Norms of Credibility** Jennifer Lackey Northwestern University
10:05-11:05	**Reading the Bad News About Our Minds** Nicholas Silins Cornell University	**Sosa on Epistemic Value: A Kantian Obstacle** Matt McGrath University of Missouri
11:05-11:25	break	
11:25-12:25	**Predictive Processing and Foundationalism about Perception** Harmen Ghijsen Radboud University	**Can Performance Epistemology Explain Reflective Epistemic Value?** Kurt Sylvan University of Southampton
12:25-2:25	lunch	
2:25-3:25	**Why we shouldn't Educate for Inquisitiveness by Example** Lani Watson University of Edinburgh	**Sensitivity and Discrimination** Guido Melchior University of Graz
3:25-3:45	break	
3:45-4:45	**Curiosity about Curiosity** Danilo Šuster University of Maribor	**Folk Epistemology and Subtle Truth-Sensitivity** Mikkel Gerken University of Southern Denmark
4:50-5:50	**Self-inquisitiveness: the Structure and Role of an Epistemic Virtue** Nenad Miščević Central European University	**A Naturalistic Approach to the Generality Problem** Erik J. Olsson Lund University

Wednesday, June 7th

	Triglavska	*Grajska*	*Riklijeva*
9:00-10:00	**Epistemic Exemplars and the Epistemic Point of View** Jason Kawall Colgate University	/	**Why E=K (And Why That's a Problem for Experimental Epistemology)** Mark Kaplan Indiana University
10:05-11:05	**Perspective and the Virtues** Wayne Riggs University of Oklahoma	**Knowing How to Reason** Joe Cruz Williams College	**Escaping the Akratic Trilemma** Klemens Kappel University of Copenhagen
11:05-11:25	break		
11:25-12:25	**Epistemic Virtue and Virtues with Epistemic Content** Chris Kelp (with Cameron Boult and Mona Simion) University of Glasgow	**Scaffolded Practical Cognition – a Problem for Intellectualists** Nikolaj Nottelmann University of Southern Denmark	**Comparing Things and Ideas** Marian David University of Graz

Thursday, June 8th

	Triglavska	*Grajska*
9:00-10:00	**Skills of Understanding versus Skills of Knowledge** Mikael Janvid Stockholm University	**A Neo-Classical Virtue Epistemology** Ben McCraw University of South Carolina Upstate
10:05-11:05	**What's the Point of Understanding?** Michael Hannon Queen's University	**The Internalist Virtue Theory of Knowledge** Ralph Wedgwood University of Southern California
11:05-11:25	break	
11:25-12:25	**Fallibility's Payoff** Catherine Elgin Harvard University	**Competent Perspectives and the New Evil Demon Problem** Lisa Miracchi University of Pennsylvania
12:25-2:25	lunch	
2:25-3:25	**Khalidi's Natural and Biological Kinds** Urška Martinc University of Maribor	**The Prizes and Perils of Trusting Others** Elizabeth Fricker Magdalen College, University of Oxford
3:25-3:45	break	
3:45-4:45	**Epistemic Blame** Jessica Brown Arché, University of St Andrews	**The Trust Argument for a Preemptionist Account of Epistemic Authority** Christoph Jäger University of Innsbruck
4:50-5:50	**Salience and Environment in Virtue Epistemology** Georgi Gardiner Rutgers University	**Expertise, Authority and Defeat: When should we defer to an Expert?** Thomas Grundmann (with Jan Constantin) University of Cologne

7.30 Conference Dinner

Friday, June 9th

	Triglavska	*Grajska*
9:00-10:00	**The Epistemic Benefits of Cognitive Diversity** Joshua Alexander Siena College	**Knowledge-Centered Epistemic Utility Theory** Branden Fitelson (with Julien Dutant) Northeastern University
10:05-11:05	**Is Open-Mindedness Truth-Conducive?** Brent Madison United Arab Emirates University	**Proper Functionalism(s)** Peter Graham University of California Riverside
11:05-11:25	break	
11:25-12:25	**Cognitive Virtues and Meliorative Epistemology** Jack Lyons University of Arkansas	**Testimonial Contractarianism** Mona Simion University of Oslo and Cardiff University
12:25-2:25	lunch	
2:25-3:25	**Trust, Self-trust, and a Feminist Approach to Epistemic Virtues** Heidi Grasswick Middlebury College	**Epistemic Access in Thought Experiments and Fiction** Tadej Todorović University of Maribor
3:25-3:45	break	
3:45-4:45	**Can an Epistemic Virtue Approach Help Combat Epistemologies of Ignorance?** Emily McWilliams Massachusetts Institute of Technology	
4.45-5.00	**Closing Remarks**	

A B S T R A C T S

The Epistemic Benefits of Cognitive Diversity

Joshua Alexander, Siena College

Recent work in the philosophy of science suggests that cognitive diversity improves inquiry. The story often goes something like this: when epistemic communities are homogeneous with respect to background assumptions, research interests, and both theoretical and methodological perspectives, those assumptions, interests, and perspectives go unnoticed and unchallenged; but when epistemic communities are diverse, these things are more likely to be subjected to critical scrutiny and evaluation. Helen Longino argues that several conditions must be met in order for this to work, among them that members of the epistemic community are willing to pay attention to dissent and able to engage dissenting views in an open-minded way. Focusing on recent work in the social sciences, we will explore here why we my worry that this condition will be extremely difficult to satisfy in practice.

The Modal Dimensions of Skillfulness and Knowledge

Bob Beddor, National University of Singapore (with Carlotta Pavese)

Skillfulness and knowledge are closely connected. Skillful actions are frequently guided by knowledge, and the acquisition of knowledge is often guided by skills. More controversially, we will argue that knowledge and skillfulness share a common modal dimension. This close connection motivates the search for a unified account of knowledge and skillful action. The current literature offers two main attempts to provide such a unified account. One of these, due to virtue epistemology, explains knowledge in terms of skillfulness. The other approach, due to Stanley and Williamson (2016), reverses this order of explanation, explaining skillfulness in terms of knowledge. In this talk, we argue that neither of these approaches predicts the modal dimensions of both skillfulness and knowledge; hence neither offers a fully satisfactory unified treatment of skillfulness and knowledge. We go on to advance two new unification strategies that fare better.

The Gettier mistake

John Biro, University of Florida

It is widely believed that the cases Gettier described in his influential paper constitute counter-examples to the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. They, and the many others modelled on them since, all hinge on the assumption that their subject believes the proposition which, our intuition tells us, he does not know. Here I question that assumption. I argue that the subjects in question do not seriously believe the propositions they supposedly infer from their justified but false beliefs. This shows not only that there is no genuine Gettier problem but also that belief and knowledge are not closed under known logical consequence.

Epistemic Blame

Jessica Brown, Arché, University of St Andrews

It seems that we can be blamed for failing to follow epistemic standards or norms governing belief or action. For instance, if someone dogmatically believes a falsehood against the evidence, then we might blame her. However, it's not obvious that the relevant blame is either moral or prudential. So what kind of blame is it, and under what conditions is one blameworthy for violating an epistemic norm? My paper seeks to address these issues.

Knowing How to Reason

Joe Cruz, Williams College

Here I motivate and defend the view that a fundamental aspect of reasoning—namely determining whether one possesses a defeater for a belief for which one has reasons—should be viewed as a kind of epistemic skill. My argument is driven by both theoretical considerations as well as by empirical literature on expert skilled performance. Along the way, I show that this species of defeater knowledge is not subject to the usual kinds of objections made to knowledge how.

Comparing Things and Ideas

Marian David, University of Graz

The thesis that we can't compare things and ideas, world and mind, has been used frequently to argue that, unless we embrace skepticism, we must accept some form of idealism or anti-realism. In the talk, I will look at some of the history of this, once extremely popular, "Can't Compare"-thesis, and I will reflect on some of the systematic issues involved in the thesis and the overall argument in which it is employed.

Three Types of Belief on Authority

Katherine Dormandy, University of Innsbruck

A normative account of belief on authority aims to clarify (1) what belief on authority is, and (2) why believing on authority is the best way to achieve truth-related epistemic goals. Linda Zagzebski, who pioneered the notion of normative belief on authority, develops a *preemptive* account addressing both aims. It says that belief on authority amounts to replacing any reasons you may have for or against the authority's belief with the reason given by the fact that the authority holds it. I discuss two common situations in which preemption is not the best way to achieve truth-related goals, and present two alternative accounts of belief on authority that can achieve them. *Corroborating* belief on authority covers situations in which you have a reason independent of the authority (either for or against the authority's belief). *Guidance* authority covers situations in which you have a reason for the authority's belief which depends on the authority for its status as a reason. Of the three types of belief on authority – preemptive, corroborating, and guidance – only the latter two are epistemically desirable when you have a reason of your own.

Fallibility's Payoff

Catherine Elgin, Harvard University

Both fallibilism and dogmatism with respect to knowledge confront paradoxes. Fallibilism is prey to a variant of Moore's paradox. Dogmatism is prey to Kripke's dogmatism paradox. The situation is different when we move from knowledge to understanding. It is epistemically unproblematic to incorporate a recognition of the possibility of error into one's understanding of a topic. The capacity for error is an epistemic asset, not a liability. Accommodating the possibility of error enables us to glean insights about to topic and about our understanding of it that would be unavailable under an infallibilist framework. This requires epistemic humility.

Merely Partial Definition and the Analysis of Knowledge

Samuel Elgin, Yale University

Two families of positions dominate debates over the analysis of knowledge. Traditionalism holds that knowledge has a complete, uniquely identifying analysis, while knowledge-first epistemology contends that knowledge is primitive—admitting of no reductive analysis whatsoever. I argue that these alternatives fail to exhaust the available possibilities. Knowledge may have a merely partial analysis: one that distinguishes it from some, but not all other things. In particular, knowledge may have a merely partial analysis consisting of justified true belief. This partial analysis distinguishes knowledge from many mental states, but not those exhibited in Gettier cases. I demonstrate that this position is not only available, but is attractive. It evades concerns its rivals face.

Revisiting the question: Emotion-judgment conflicts and rational revision

Kelly Epley, University of Oklahoma

Emotions are generally viewed as positive contributors to our cognitive lives because they provide us with quick evaluative responses. Often, our emotional dispositions are well-attuned to the sorts of things that make them apt. We're happy, sad, proud, or afraid when there is good reason to be, and our emotions and judgments about the situation will accord. Nevertheless, our emotions and judgments sometimes diverge: We find ourselves mourning something that we've judged to be no loss, or frightened of something we've judged to be harmless. When our emotions persist in the face of a contrary judgment, our emotions are viewed with suspicion. After all, such persistent emotions might cause us to reopen questions that should remain settled. Once reopened, we're liable to revise our judgments and intentions on the basis of reasons that we've already considered and judged to have little merit or weight. A number of philosophers have suggested that any "reasons" to change our attitudes an emotion might draw our attention to aren't really reasons at all (Goldie 2009; Brady 2009). They're spurious. This accords with some widely assumed rational principles concerning the rational authority of judgment and the need to be resolute. These principles appear to foreclose the possibility of rational attitude revision on the basis of conflicting emotions. In this paper, I argue to the contrary. A well-cultivated emotion in an appropriate domain can give us sufficient reason to re-open a question and, possibly, to revise our previous judgments and intentions.

Knowledge-Centered Epistemic Utility Theory

Branden Fitelson, Northeastern University (with Julien Dutant)

The standard assumption made by contemporary epistemic utility theorists is (Veritism) that truth/accuracy (of belief) is the only thing of positive epistemic value. We look at what happens when knowledge (rather than mere true belief) is given pride of place in epistemic utility theory. Some interesting new rational requirements for belief may be derived. We'll explain how, and also look at some fun applications.

The Prizes and Perils of Trusting Others

Elizabeth Fricker. Fellow, Magdalen College Oxford, and Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Oxford. *From January 2018*: Visiting Professor, University of Notre Dame.

In the modern world, each one of us enjoys huge benefits arising from the exercise of specialised epistemic and practical expertises by others. One depends for these benefits on these others who possess skills that one lacks oneself. This dependence is direct when one trusts what an expert in some domain tells one, or relies on an expert to exercise a specialist practical skill on one's behalf; and indirect, when one relies directly on complex machines and technology designed by such experts.

This dependence engenders risks, as well as gains. Moreover, it may be that one forgoes something that is part of human flourishing, when one fails to acquire a skill, and instead relies entirely on others, or on devices designed and created by others, to achieve a practical end. I consider these matters. In particular, I consider the status of the following principle, considered as applying to all humans:

SkillsHaveIntrinsicValue (SHIV): For any possible human skill (practical-and/or-epistemic), one has some reason (pro tanto reason) to acquire that skill; where this reason is not merely instrumental; and applies to one regardless of whether one has subjective inclination to acquire that skill.

I will argue that the unrestricted principle SHIV has no obvious defence available; but that there is a plausible case to be made that each one of us has some reason to acquire some skills (to bring it about that there are some skills that one possesses); and furthermore, that there are certain core skills - whose possession and exercise is essential to human agency - that each and every one of us has some reason to acquire. I suggest that the ability to locate oneself in one's environment, and to navigate one's way around it unaided, is such a core skill.

Implicit Bias and Qualiefs

Martina Fürst, University of Graz

Cases in which one explicitly endorses anti-discriminatory beliefs but does not act in accordance with them are heavily discussed in the current literature and motivate a philosophical analysis of *implicit bias*. The goal of this talk is to offer a novel account of implicit bias that explains why subjects in such conflict cases are not aware of the tension between their explicit beliefs and their implicit biases.

I proceed as follows: First, I argue that implicit bias is best analyzed as belief-like states that involve a special usage of phenomenal concepts. I dub these states "qualiefs" for three reasons: they constitutively involve qualitative properties, they share some of the distinctive features of proper beliefs and they also share some characteristics of Gendler´s notion of "aliefs". Second, I show that the proposed model is explanatorily powerful. It accounts for the bias's implicitness, automaticity and insensitivity to evidence. Importantly, the qualief-model also explains why subjects harboring an implicit bias are not aware that it stands in tension with their explicit anti-discriminatory beliefs.

Salience and Environment in Virtue Epistemology

Georgi Gardiner, Rutgers University

Robust virtue epistemology is the thesis that knowledge is true belief obtained through cognitive ability. The viability of robust virtue epistemology depends in large part on how we interpret the 'through' relation. Greco interprets this 'through' relation as a relation of causal explanation; the success is through the agent's abilities iff the abilities play a sufficiently salient role in a causal explanation of why she possesses a true belief. In this paper I argue that Greco's account of the 'through' relation is inadequate, and I explain why salience is the wrong kind of property to track epistemically relevant conditions or to capture the nature of knowledge. I then suggest a better way to refine robust virtue epistemology.

Folk Epistemology and Subtle Truth-Sensitivity

Mikkel Gerken, University of Southern Denmark

Several studies have found a robust effect of truth on epistemic evaluation of belief, decision, action and assertion. Thus, truth has a significant effect on normative participant evaluations. Some theorists take this truth effect to motivate factive epistemic norms of belief, action, assertion etc. In contrast, I argue that the truth effect is best understood as an epistemic instance of the familiar and ubiquitous phenomenon of outcome bias. I support this diagnosis from three perspectives: (1) by epistemological theorizing, (2) by considerations from cognitive psychology and (3) by methodological reflections on the relationship between folk epistemology and epistemological theorizing.

Predictive Processing and Foundationalism about Perception

Harmen Ghijsen, Radboud University

Predictive processing accounts of perception (PP) maintain that perception does not work in a purely bottom-up fashion but that it also uses acquired knowledge to make top- down predictions about the incoming sensory signals. This provides a challenge for foundationalist accounts of perception according to which perceptual beliefs are epistemically basic, that is, epistemically independent from other beliefs. If prior beliefs rationally in-fuence which perceptual beliefs we come to accept, then foundationalism about perception appears untenable. I review several ways in which foundationalism might be reconciled with PP from both internalist and externalist perspectives, and argue that an externalist foundationalism provides the best match with PP.

Proper Functionalism(s)

Peter Graham, University of California Riverside

What is proper functionalism? Who are the proper functionalists? How are they alike and how do they differ? And who is on the right track?

Trust, Self-trust, and a Feminist Approach to Epistemic Virtues

Heidi Grasswick, Middlebury College

One of the major themes of feminist epistemology has been the need to account for the role of power-infused social relations when it comes to knowing well. For example, recent work on epistemic injustices (Fricker 2007; Medina 2013; Dotson 2011) has emphasized the ways in which social prejudices, implicit biases, and willful hermeneutical ignorances (Pohlhaus 2012) can result in epistemic losses for variously situated inquirers. Much of this work adopts the language and framework of epistemic virtues. Fricker, for example, discusses the corrective virtue of testimonial justice, and Medina explicitly argues that one's social situation can make certain virtues and vices harder or easier to develop. Following Daukas (2011), I argue that the basic parameters of a responsibilist virtue epistemology can serve feminists well, although it needs to account for structural features of our knowledge-seeking practices in addition to the virtues that might be embodied in individuals. As a way of connecting the individual and the social/structural elements of knowing, I focus my discussion on the relationship between trust (understood as trust-in-others) and self-trust, arguing that self-trust needs to be problematized more than it has been if we are to understand the interdependence of these two forms of trust. To know well in a power-infused social world, inquirers need to be able to negotiate through multiple perspectives, and ultimately recognize when our socially-informed epistemic practices require transformation. The correct balance of self-trust and trust-in-others can assist in that goal.

Expertise, Authority and Defeat: When should we defer to an Expert?

Thomas Grundmann, University of Cologne (with Jan Constantin)

When one is a layperson in some domain, it is a good idea to trust the judgments of experts in that domain when it comes to forming beliefs about the relevant subject matter. This fact underpins a division of epistemic labor that is crucial to the successful and widespread epistemic practices of modern civilizations. To "trust the judgments of experts", however, can mean a variety of things. On one end of the spectrum is the view that the layperson should defer to the expert completely, such that she is rationally required to ignore all of her own evidence and blindly adopt the expert's beliefs (cf. Zagzebski 2012). On the other end is the view that information about the expert beliefs is just one more piece of evidence (albeit a weighty one) to be added to one's total evidence (cf. Jäger 2016; Lackey manuscript). Neither view adequately respects the broader epistemic principles in play here.

What makes it rational for a layperson to follow an expert's lead is that, normally, the expert is an epistemic authority for her about the domain of expertise. An authority is someone whom one has justification to take to be both generally good and better than oneself in finding the right attitudes within the domain. Clearly, laypeople often have this sort of justification

with respect to experts. Since being generally good at finding the right attitudes must involve deep familiarity with the available evidence, having justification for the expert's status as an authority also provides (defeasible) justification to believe that the expert has already considered all of the layperson's own evidence within the relevant domain. Learning that an expert holds an attitude within their domain of expertise that is different from one's own, therefore, typically amounts to learning that someone more competent than oneself has formed a competing attitude in light of one's own evidence about the matter. This constitutes an undercutting defeater and undercutting defeaters characteristically defeat by making it irrational to further rely on one's original evidence. However, it does not follow that information about differing attitudes of experts always undercuts in this way or that such attitudes must be accepted blindly. There are important limitations that flow naturally from the characteristics of the conception of epistemic authority and the mechanics of undercutting defeat: Since authority applies to specific domains, defeater-defeaters for expert-attitudes can be obtained from outside of them. The layperson may, for example, find out that the expert was drunk when she formed her attitude or there are independent reasons to think that the expert has not considered the layperson's evidence, in which case that evidence can rationally be used. This fits our intuitive judgments on a wide variety of examples. The correct way to describe the epistemic relationship between experts and laypeople thus appeals to undercutting defeaters and requires neither blind deference, nor full self-reliance on the part of the layperson.

References:

Jäger, Christoph (2016). Epistemic Authority, Preemptive Reasons and Understanding. Episteme 13 (2), 167-185.

Lackey, Jennifer (unpublished manuscript). Experts and Peer Disagreement.

Zagzebski, Linda (2012). Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority and Autonomy in Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

What's the Point of Understanding?

Michael Hannon, Queen's University

What is human understanding and why should we care about it? I propose a method of philosophical investigation called 'function-first epistemology' and use this method to investigate the nature and value of understanding. I argue that the concept of understanding serves the practical function of identifying good explainers, which is an important role in the general economy of our concepts. This hypothesis sheds light on a variety of issues in the epistemology of understanding, including the role of explanation in understanding, the relationship between understanding and knowledge, and the value of understanding. I conclude that understanding is valuable and yet knowledge plays more important roles in our epistemic life.

Hope and the Virtue of Creative Resolve

Nicole Hassoun, Binghamton University

This paper defends a new intellectual and moral virtue that I call *creative resolve*. This resolve requires us to try hard to come up with new ways of securing valuable goods. I believe it is important to articulate, and provide some reason to endorse, this virtue for a few reasons. First, the virtue does not appear on canonical lists of the virtues but, I will argue that, recognizing it may help guide action and efforts at character development. Second, I believe it holds revolutionary potential for helping us transform political systems and deal with some of the most pressing threats of the 21st Century like climate change. To make this case, I will argue that the virtue does not only rely on a kind of hope, it embodies it. And, in doing so, it can allow us to respond effectively to oppression, disaffection, and other vices that threaten the very fabric of our relations with others in this rapidly changing world.

Virtuous epistemic agency

Terry Horgan, University of Arizona and Matjaž Potrč, University of Ljubljana

Phenomenology invites to treat the cognizing, belief-forming, creature as an agent and belief fixation as an exercise of agency. Phenomenologically, there's plenty that's first-person agentive, or at least quasi-agentive: occupying the zero-point in the space of reasons, appreciating reasons qua reasons, forming judgments for reasons. Forming the belief that p, though an act of judgment, normally is a non-voluntary process, experientially. Still, though, the phenomenology of appreciating the evidential force of reasons, and of coming to believe because of the appreciated evidential force of reasons, is very different from the paradigmatic phenomenology as-of experienced state-causal phenomena. Being an epistemic agent, one strives to be a virtuous one, and to become more virtuous and avoid epistemic vices. Likewise, one evaluates others in terms of their virtuousness or lack thereof. Although various approaches, such as teleological and deontological forms of evaluation, often are regarded as being in opposition, they needn't be. Especially within an agent-first framework. There are means and ends, in a hierarchy of goals toward which one can and should strive, to be a virtuous epistemic agent: a. Believing only what's true, and enough of what's true, and what's important as true. b. Believing what's objectively likely to be true, given one's total available evidence. c. Deploying suitably reliable belief-forming processes. d. Subjective rationality. e. Experiential rationality. Teleological evaluation occurs toward the upper end of this hierarchy and deontological evaluation toward the lower end. How does the virtue approach connect to various standard approaches/issues? There's a way both to unify many of them and also to regard them as not really in tension with one another, by situating them within an approach in which the notion of virtue figures centrally.

The trust argument for a preemptionist account of epistemic authority

Christoph Jäger, University of Innsbruck

Preemptionist accounts of epistemic authority argue that when you learn that an epistemic authority (fully or partially) believes that p you should (i) adopt the authority's doxastic attitude and (ii) replace your own reasons concerning whether p with the sole reason that the authority believes that p. An important argument for this view is the trust argument: Trusting someone (to do something) involves making oneself vulnerable to her; so trusting an epistemic authority requires "lowering one's epistemic guard" and thus to abstain from employing own reasons (even as additional or back-up justifiers). I examine the trust argument and argue that it fails to support preemptionism. Instead, the risk constitutive of epistemic trust can be explained in terms of the trustor's uncertainty about reaching the truth when adopting the authority's attitude.

Skills of Understanding versus Skills of Knowledge

Mikael Janvid, Stockholm University

This paper investigates what epistemic properties distinguish understanding from knowledge and to what extent these distinctive features constitute skills. In particular, the focus is on how to spell out the notion of grasping the relationships between propositions that constitute objectual understanding: what kind of access is required for grasping to take place and to what extent is the act of grasping voluntary? A modest form of access is suggested as an answer to the first question and a largely negative answer to the second. The worry that my suggestion is too permissive in crediting subjects with understanding is addressed. The results are then finally briefly contrasted to Ernest Sosa's notion of knowing full well.

Why E=K (And Why That's a Problem for Experimental Epistemology)

Mark Kaplan, Indiana University

Is it important for us, as inquirers, to decide what we know? My brief is that it is. As inquirers, we are often called upon evaluate what case we have for a claim. That requires us assess what evidence we have available to bring to bear on whether the claim in question is true. And (I will argue), if we don't want to commit ourselves to a methodologically mad way of evaluating the cases we make for claims, we must hold that P is part of our evidence iff we know that P. The upshot is that our decisions, as to what we know, are important (at least in part) by virtue of being methodologically important. And that is precisely why (I will argue) it cannot be of any moment (to a properly conducted inquiry into the nature and extent of our knowledge) what naïve respondents say about Gettier-style cases.

Escaping the Akratic Trilemma

Klemens Kappel, University of Copenhagen

Recent discussion on the nature of higher order evidence have evolved around what I will call The Akratic Trilemma, which is the following:

(E1) S's credence in her belief that p should rationally reflect e and only e, where e is S's evidence bearing on the truth of p.

(E2) S's beliefs regarding higher order propositions p' (concerning e and p, and their evidential relations, epistemic performance etc.) should rationally reflect S's evidence e' (and only e') bearing on the truth of p'.

(E3) It is epistemically irrational for S to have high credence in p on the basis of some body of evidence e, and at the same time have high credence that e does not support p, or that S's processing of e is somehow faulty (The Non-Akrasia Requirement).

If (E1) and (E2) exhausted the rationality requirements on S, then believing p, while also believing that one's evidence e does not support p could come out as fully rational. But according to the Non-Akrasia Requirement, such epistemic akrasia is irrational. So, on the face of it, we cannot accept both (E1), (E2) and (E3). Yet, they all seem prima facie plausible.

A number of different responses to this problem is found in the recent literature (for similar ways of outlining the problem, see (Sliwa and Horowitz 2015a; Horowitz 2014; Aarnio 2014; Worsnip 2015)).

In my contribution, I will critically discuss on two recent responses to The Akratic Trilemma. Titelbaum (2013) defends a view according to which when first order evidence make an object level belief warranted one cannot have justification for a higher order belief that this is not the case. This permits one to preserve the three lemmas, while denying that they can conflict. I will argue that Titelbaum's argument for this position is unsatisfactory, as it essentially amounts to asserting that one should assume (E1) and (E3), and then infer on pain of inconsistency that when S's first order belief that p is warranted by e, then S cannot be warranted in a higher order belief that e is not good evidence for p.

A second recent response to The Akratic Trilemma asserts that is is possible to be fullyrational in believing that p on some evidence e, while also rationally believing on evidence e' that e is not good evidence for p. The fact that the levels are in tension is not a mark of epistemic irrationality, but just an unfortunate fact about how one's evidence is lined up. This view denies (E3). Lasonen-Aarnio has recently defended a version of such a view in detail arguing that given certain plausible and widely shared assumptions it is impossible to make sense of the idea that higher order evidence defeats justification based on first order evidence. Her argument asserts that epistemology must be rule-governed, but that one cannot

state a rule for how one should believe on one's evidence that also allows for higher order evidence to defeat first order evidence. Her argument supports the idea that one should escape the The Akratic Trilemma by rejecting (E3). I argue that Lasonen-Aarnio's argument fails, and I do so 2 by suggesting a way in which epistemology can both be rule-governed and permit defeat by higher order evidence.

My contribution will thus be an indirect defense of another way to avoid the trilemma which we might call Calibration (cf. Sliwa and Horowitz 2015b; Horowitz 2014). This is the view that first order and higher order evidence should somehow be adjusted to one another when they conflict. This view advocates that we retain the Non-Akratic Constraint, and consequently recommends that (E1) or (E2) should be be modified. If space permits, I consider the plausibility of this view.

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Epistemic Exemplars and the Epistemic Point of View

Jason Kawall, Colgate University

In this paper I attempt (i) to take certain important steps towards characterizing exemplary epistemic agents, and (ii) to defend a wide epistemic point of view that reflects and captures such exemplars. Intuitively, to determine whether an agent is doing exceptionally well epistemically, we need to have some sense of what qualifies as epistemic; on the other hand, by examining epistemic saints or exemplars, we can come to have a better sense of the scope and nature of the epistemic point of view. Broadly, my approach is one of attempting to achieve a reflective equilibrium. I argue that to capture plausible epistemic exemplars, we must turn to a wide epistemic point of view – one that is wider than that embraced by many epistemologists. In particular, I argue that epistemic exemplars generate valuable instances of knowledge (or other epistemic states), but where the relevant values could be moral, pragmatic, and so on, and not merely narrowly epistemic. This is not to abandon epistemology, but rather to recognize that normative domains – including the epistemic – are often intertwined.

Epistemic Virtue and Virtues with Epistemic Content

Chris Kelp, University of Glasgow (with Cameron Boult and Mona Simion)

The investigation of epistemic virtues, such as curiosity, open-mindedness, intellectual courage and intellectual humility is a growing trend in epistemology. An underexplored question in this context is: what is the relationship between these virtues and other types of virtue, such as moral or prudential virtue? This paper argues that, although there is an intuitive sense in which virtues such as intellectual courage and open-mindedness have something to do with the epistemic domain, on closer inspection it is not clear to what extent they should be understood as genuine epistemic virtues. We draw a distinction between epistemic virtues and virtues with epistemic content and provide reason to believe that the aforementioned virtues are non-epistemic virtues with epistemic content rather than bona fide epistemic virtues. The upshot is that there are far fewer epistemic virtues out there than commonly assumed.

Intellectual Humility and Norms of Credibility

Jennifer Lackey, Northwestern University

What is the norm governing our credibility assessments of others? According to Miranda Fricker, the answer is "obvious": we should match the level of credibility attributed to others to the evidence that they are offering the truth. Testimonial injustice occurs, on this view, when a speaker is given a credibility deficit, which is less credibility than the evidence calls for. In this paper, I show that this evidentialist norm fails to recognize the role that credibility surpluses, and evidence that we ought to have, play in our credibility assessments of others, thereby leading to the identification and development of two further kinds of testimonial injustice: *distributive* and *normative*. I then develop and defend an alternative norm—what I call the *Wide Norm of Credibility*—that not only avoids the problems afflicting the evidentialist version, but also makes vivid the role that intellectual humility needs to play in our epistemic lives.

Cognitive virtues and meliorative epistemology

Jack Lyons, University of Arkansas

Meliorative epistemology aims at improving people's epistemic activity. The most obvious results of meliorative epistemology are belief-formation canons of the sort we find in a critical thinking textbook: an organon, or set of rules for reasoning. One natural way to understand these rules is as specifying what counts as evidence for what, but both virtue reliabilism and responsibilist virtue epistemology want to understand epistemic success in nonevidential terms. Here I discuss the difficulties in fitting the different kinds of virtue theories into a meliorative project, as well as a way forward for a nonevidentialist organon.

Is Open-Mindedness Truth-Conducive?

BJC Madison, United Arab Emirates University

What makes an intellectual virtue a virtue, and by contrast, an intellectual vice a vice? A popular and influential answer to this question has been given by virtue-reliabilists: a trait is a virtue only insofar as it is conducive to the acquisition of true beliefs, and the avoidance of false beliefs.

Open-mindedness is a paradigm virtue, so one might wonder, is open-mindedness truth-conducive? In a recent paper, Jack Kwong explores this question, with the aim of defending the reliabilist view that a trait is an intellectual virtue to the extent that it reliably leads to truth. In this paper I shall argue that the considerations Kwong offers are good as far as they go, and they advance the debate by usefully clarifying ways in how best to understand the nature of open-mindedness. But his reflections do not establish the desired conclusions that open-mindedness is truth-conducive, and that it is a virtue because it is truth-conducive.

To establish these much stronger conclusions we would need an adequate reply to what I shall call Montmarquet's objection, and in Kwong's paper, no reply is given. I shall also argue that Linda Zagzebski's reply to Montmarquet's objection, to which Kwong defers, is inadequate. I conclude that we are left with the original problem Kwong sought to address: it is contingent if open-mindedness is truth-conducive, and if a necessary tie to truth is what makes an intellectual virtue a virtue, then the status of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is jeopardised. We either need an adequate reliabilist response to Montmarquet's objection, or else seek alternative accounts of what it is that makes a virtue a virtue.

Khalidi's Natural and Biological Kinds

Urška Martinc, University of Maribor

In this article, we will analyse the problems of philosophy of biology. One of the problems is the problem of biological kinds. Problems will be analysed using examples from biology. The main question here is if biological kinds are natural kinds. We will use mainly the works of Muhammad Ali Khalidi, especially his work Natural Categories and Human Kinds (2013).

Muhammad Ali Khalidi defends the existence of natural kinds in the 'special sciences', such as biological science. Khalidi also gives us some candidates that could be good candidates for natural kinds in the biological sciences.

Khalidi is discussing the main challenges that might be perceived to prevent biological and social kinds from being natural kinds. We will analyse his examples and the question whether biological kinds are natural kinds. We will try to compare natural kinds in chemistry with

natural kinds in biology. In the last part, the answer to the question is given, claiming that natural kinds exist in biological kinds.

A Neo-Classical Virtue Epistemology

Ben McCraw, University of South Carolina Upstate

In this paper, I aim to sketch (briefly) and motivate (again, briefly) what I call a neo-classical virtue epistemology. More particularly, I develop a hybrid neo-Aristotelian/neo-Stoic approach to epistemic virtue. Considering Aristotle's generic account of a moral virtue provides how I consider the *nature* or *structure* of intellectual virtues; albeit somewhat differently than other extant Neo-Aristotelian virtue epistemologies.

While this model, thus, counts as a virtue "responsibilism," its contours differ from the other responsibilisms in the literature and, as I shall argue, is more amenable to non-responsibilist accounts of epistemic virtue. In this way, the model is ecumenical. I use some Stoic thoughts to develop the value or good-making features of virtues; arguing for internalist epistemic virtues. Given that most extant virtue epistemologies have some kind of externalist proviso, leaning, etc., in this respect, my neo-classical model is revisionary.

The account that results has non-trivial and (hopefully) interesting bases in two important classical traditions on virtue and works into the current debate on virtue epistemology as an internalist responsibilism.

Sosa on Epistemic Value: A Kantian Obstacle

Matt McGrath, University of Missouri

True belief is better than false belief. Knowledge is better than mere true belief. Knowledge is better than mere justified true belief. Such claims are familiar from the literature on epistemic value. They are widely accepted. Like many epistemologists, Ernest Sosa seeks a comprehensive theory of epistemic value that explains these claims about comparative value. Not only that: like many epistemologists, he seeks an account of what sort of value this is, its source and nature.

Sosa has provided just such a comprehensive account, developed over the last few decades, culminating in his recent books *Knowing Full Well* and especially *Judgment and Agency*. Crucial to the account is an axiology of performances, a category he argues includes beliefs. One of the theoretical virtues of his account is precisely its generality. The account applies to performances, and claims about epistemic value fall out as simple consequences, given the premise that beliefs are themselves performances of a certain sort.

I argue that, despite its theoretical attractiveness, the account is problematic. Powerful Kantian intuitions undermine his axiology when applied to attempts. In a final section, I consider whether we might revise Sosa's axiology so as to accommodate these intuitions. What we arrive at is an internalistic version of Sosa's virtue epistemology. I sketch and assess the prospects for this "competence-theoretic internalism."

Can an Epistemic Virtue Approach Help Combat Epistemologies of Ignorance?

Emily Colleen McWilliams, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Empirical psychology documents widespread evidence of bias in the ways that people select, interpret, and selectively interpret evidence in order to form and revise their beliefs. These biases sometimes function to perpetuate *epistemologies of ignorance*. Fricker (2007) and others have suggested that some biases can be ameliorated by the development of individual compensatory epistemic virtues. But Sherman (2015), Alfano (2015), and other *epistemic situationists* have expressed worries about the empirical plausibility of this solution.

While it is far from clear that Fricker's virtue-based solution for countering the type of bias she discusses is empirically plausible, I argue that the situation is not entirely grim. Rather than trying to develop our epistemic virtue from the armchair, we can look to empirical literature to help us draw a roadmap towards the needed types of virtue. We can use our best empirical understandings of where and how particular biases manifest in order to develop a series of heuristics tailored to counter them, as a way of beginning to habituate ourselves towards the needed epistemic virtues with situation-specific rules.

Sensitivity and Discrimination

Guido Melchior, University of Graz

Nozick (1981) argued that sensitivity is necessary for knowing, i.e. S knows that p only if S would not believe that p if p were false. Sensitivity accounts of knowledge suffer from well-known problems. One plausible reaction to these problems is to replace sensitivity by the alternative modal principle of safety. In this paper, I will sketch a modal account of discrimination. I will argue that discrimination requires a sensitive method and that safety is not sufficient for discrimination. I conclude that sensitivity marks a crucial distinction between knowledge and discrimination.

Competent Perspectives and the New Evil Demon Problem

Lisa Miracchi, University of Pennsylvania

I extend my knowledge-first virtue epistemology to account for two kinds of positive epistemic standing, one tracked by externalists, who claim that the subject in an evil demon scenario lacks justification, the other tracked by internalists, who claim that she has it. I argue that justified beliefs in both senses are *good candidates* for knowledge, and are such because they are exercises of competences to know. In developing this view, I also defend a new approach to the new evil demon problem, one which takes internalist intuitions seriously but denies the metaphysical possibility of the case. I show how this approach enables the knowledge-first virtue epistemologist to provide a unified account of the subjective and objective aspects of epistemic justification.

Scaffolded practical cognition – a problem for intellectualists

Nikolaj Nottelmann, University of Southern Denmark

Intellectualists characteristically give up on actual ability as a necessary requirement for practical knowledge. Hence, they face a potential bloating problem; the problem of being committed to far more practical knowledge ascriptions than seems reasonable. Leading intellectualists like Bengson & Moffett have taken measures against this threat, arguing e.g. that one cannot know a way to phi, if one is yet to learn a way to phi, e.g. through a manual. However, this strategy must be carefully finetuned, unless it rules out many plausible types of practical knowledge ascriptions, e.g. to a typical expert aircraft mechanic heavily reliant upon factory blueprints. In this talk, I discuss intellecualists' options for this kind of finetuning.

A Naturalistic Approach to the Generality Problem

Erik J. Olsson, Lund University

The generality problem is the problem of how to determine the type of a belief forming process token. Without a solution any theory which relies on the reliability of belief formation processes, such as the reliabilist theory of knowledge or justification famously defended by Alvin I. Goldman and others, is thought to be seriously incomplete. Goldman has addressed the issue in numerous places though without converging on a definite solution. I argue that while the generality problem, as standardly advanced, is not a genuine problem for reliabilism, there is an ingenious version, due to Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, which does present an immediate threat. Drawing on the basic level tradition in cognitive psychology, I find that Conee and Feldman's argument relies nevertheless on an empirically

false premise. I conclude that the present proposal for dealing with the generality issue is consonant with Goldman's commitment to naturalized epistemology.

Perspective and the Virtues

Wayne Riggs, University of Oklahoma

Many of our epistemological evaluations presuppose (or should presuppose) that the agent is operating within a particular "perspective." But there has not been a lot of work done expounding on the notion of "perspective" in epistemology generally. This paper will explore the role of perspective in some of the intellectual virtues, especially open-mindedness and wisdom.

Knowledge need not be the product of virtue

Simon Rippon, Central European University

Knowledge is not mere true belief. But what more is it? Virtue epistemologists claim, roughly, that knowledge is true belief manifesting the believer's successfully exercised cognitive abilities, or epistemic virtues. Others claim that knowledge requires safe, true belief (i.e., belief that could not easily have been false). Duncan Pritchard advocates a hybrid view, treating each of these two proposals as independent, necessary conditions of knowledge. I critique the arguments of Pritchard and others for an ability condition on knowledge. I argue that there is scope for a safety condition alone to explain intuitions about absence of knowledge in well-known cases, and following Lackey, I propose cases of knowledge that cannot be understood as the product of the believer's epistemic virtues.

Unethical Knowledge, Practicalism and Intellectualism

Nicholas Shackel, Cardiff University

I distinguish pragmatic and intellectualist views in the ethics of belief and on the normativity of knowledge and show that a particular combination is equivalent to the possibilty of unethical knowledge.

Reading the Bad News About Our Minds

Nicholas Silins, Cornell University

My paper aims to evaluate recent philosophical discussions of defeaters in light of evidence from psychology. I will consider studies of putative phenomena such as the following: conscious experiences that are cognitively inaccessible to us, judgments of CVs based on bias rather than merit, judgments that a Black subject is holding a gun when he's not, or judgments of your hunger when you're unknowingly eating from a bottomless bowl of soup. What exactly is the bad news about the mind that such studies deliver? What can epistemology learn from such bad news about the mind?

Testimonial Contractarianism

Mona Simion, CSMN/ConceptLab, University of Oslo and Arché Research Centre, University of St Andrews

According to strong anti-reductionism (SAR) in the epistemology of testimony, testimonial entitlement is easy to come by: all you need to do is listen to what you are being told. Now, say you like SAR; one question that you will need to answer is how it can be that testimonial entitlement can come so cheaply. After all, people are free to lie. Furthermore, they tend to be self-interested in the first instance, so we'd expect them to lie when this furthers their own interests. But how, then, could it be that we are entitled to believe on mere say-so?

One ambitious solution to this problem is due to Tyler Burge, who attempts to offer an a priori vindication of testimony as a source of entitlement. In a nutshell, according to Burge, since reason aims at truth, both the content of intelligible propositional presentations-as-true and the prima facie rationality of their source indicate a prima facie source of truth.

This talk has two aims: first, it argues that the Burge solution fails, due to implausible function-theoretic commitments. Second, it goes on a rescue mission on behalf of SAR. I put forth a social strong anti-reductionist account, which I dub 'Testimonial Contractarianism'. According to the view defended here, in virtue of the social contract in play, compliance with the norms governing speech acts is the default position for speakers. Insofar as norm compliance is the default for speakers, I argue, all else equal, entitlement to believe is the default for hearers.

Epistemic virtues as epistemic skills – a lack of character and agency?

Matt Stichter, Washington State University

Skills may seem to be a poor model for epistemic virtues for (at least) two reasons that relate to character and agency. First, since a virtue theoretic approach explains the normative properties of an action or belief in terms of the properties of the agent, it would be problematic if the exercise of a putative virtue demonstrated a lack of agency. However, a significant aspect of the processes involved with skill acquisition and skilled performances is characterized by automaticity, whereby actions are triggered without deliberate choice or even conscious awareness. Actions resulting from the triggering of an automatic process appear to lack the kind of conscious control necessary for agency, and thus would fall short of expressing virtue.

Second, even if we overcome the worry about agency, virtue theorists commonly argue that virtue requires being intrinsically motivated by a concern for the good (e.g. epistemic goods like knowledge or understanding). However, the acquisition and successful exercise of skills can be motivated by purely instrumental concerns, and without that instrumental motivation counting against one's level of skillfulness. So when it comes to evaluating skilled performances, a successful performance is no less successful for having been motivated by instrumental reasons (like for money or fame), and this is supposed to mark a difference with how we make evaluations of virtue.

In response to the first concern, I argue that while control is fundamental to agency, we should not equate control with the use of deliberate cognitive processes and in contrast to automatic processes (as is commonly done in the literature on dual-process theories of cognition). Rather, control should be understood in terms of goal-directed behavior, and that deliberate and automatic processes both have the potential to either support or undermine achievement of one's goals. In response to the second concern, even in the case of evaluating skillfulness, we can raise further questions about what motivated the performance in order to evaluate whether the performer was being responsive to the ends of their practice. Likewise, I argue that we can evaluate an exercise of epistemic skill as to whether it is partially motivated by a responsiveness to epistemic goods. Thus, I defend epistemic skills as a type of epistemic virtue.

Curiosity about Curiosity: Remarks on Inan

Danilo Šuster, University of Maribor

Ilhan Inan's (2012) approach to curiosity is based on the following central theses: (i) for every question asked out of curiosity there is a corresponding term that is inostensible for the asker (its reference is unknown) and that has the function of uniquely identifying an object; (ii) the satisfaction of curiosity is always in the form of coming to know an object as falling under a concept. This model primarily covers curiosity as our search for empirical objectual knowledge. In my critical reflections (Šuster 2016), I explore some phenomena of non-objectual curiosity which are left out or at least not sufficiently explored by Inan: curiosity as the search for understanding (why-curiosity), and "meta-curiosity" – curiosity about the very representations, i.e. how to conceptualize a certain problem, and what definite descriptions to use in the first place. Inan (2016) replied to some of the critical remarks and I here try to further develop the notion of meta-curiosity.

Can Performance Epistemology Explain Reflective Epistemic Value?

Kurt Sylvan, University of Southampton

Judgment and Agency contains Sosa's latest effort to explain how reflective epistemic status of the sort coveted by internalists might be a special case of performance normativity, with its superior value following from truisms about performance value. This paper argues that the new effort rests on a mistaken assumption about how performance normativity works. Once this mistaken assumption is exposed, it becomes clear that reflective epistemic status cannot be a mere special case of performance normativity, and its superiority cannot be guaranteed just by truisms about performance value. Section 1 sets the stage, clarifying the thesis and the relevant features of Sosa's strategy, and explaining why the strategy requires the mistaken assumption. Section 2 presents a dilemma for the new account of reflective epistemic status. Section 3 deepens the case for one of the horns. Section 4 addresses two lingering responses and Section 5 takes stock and draws a broader moral.

Epistemic Access in Thought Experiments and Fiction

Tadej Todorović, University of Maribor

In her 2014 article, "Fiction and Thought Experiment", Elgin argues in favour of ascribing both thought experiments and fiction epistemic access. This paper tries to offer a different perspective, one that would retain the special status of thought experiments and would simultaneously not completely disregard fiction as a source of knowledge.

Firstly, we present Elgin's reasoning as to why standard experiments grant epistemic access, and why phenomena occurring in nature do not. Then we look at her reasons for ascribing epistemic access to thought experiments. We will find that the reasons for ascribing epistemic access to TEs are very similar to the reasons for ascribing epistemic access to standard experiments, i.e. both isolate the phenomenon that they are studying in a similar fashion. Then we will look at her reasons for why the same privilege should be granted to fiction in general. By doing this, we will notice that the additional properties that works of fiction add seem to be the very things that we consciously removed when constructing TEs and standard experiments. In other words, we ascribe epistemic access to TEs and standard experiments *because* they isolate a phenomenon in a similar way. Fiction is more similar to a phenomenon occurring in nature – it is not isolated. A proposal is made that we should treat fiction as feeding grounds for TE but that we should not ascribe epistemic access to it, analogical to how we use nature as feeding grounds for standard experiments.

Phenomenal commitments: A puzzle for experiential theories of emotion

Jona Vance, Northern Arizona University

This paper raises and responds to a puzzle for experiential theories of emotion. Experiential theories entail that some emotions just are experiences. The puzzle is to explain how subjects could be rationally evaluable in virtue of their emotional experiences. Experiential theories entail that subjects are rationally evaluable in virtue of their emotional experiences, in conjunction with the desideratum that subjects are rationally evaluable in virtue of their emotions. Component theories entail that no emotions just are experiences. On some component theories, the experience component of emotion is distinct from the rationally evaluable component. These theories do not face the puzzle. As a result, these component theories have a potential advantage over experiential theories. In response to the puzzle, I defend experiential theories of emotion. Like many others, I argue that the rational evaluability of subjects in virtue of their emotions requires rationally evaluable subjective commitments. Unlike many others, I argue that the commitments need not be even partly constitutive of emotions. Instead, I suggest that emotional experiences are rationally evaluable because of their relation to other commitments the subject makes and the socially embedded norms that govern those commitments.

Why we shouldn't educate for inquisitiveness by example

Lani Watson, University of Edinburgh

The intellectual virtue of inquisitiveness is an important and early intellectual virtue to educate for. It plays a critical role in motivating intellectually virtuous inquiry in the classroom and many key components of the virtue arise naturally in young children. One of these is a tendency to ask questions. This tendency can and should be harnessed in order to educate for the virtue of inquisitiveness (Watson 2016). Over and above a tendency to ask questions, the virtue of inquisitiveness requires that a person is motivated and able to engage sincerely in *good questioning*. Educating for virtuous inquisitiveness therefore requires educating for the skill of good questioning and the motivation to engage in it. Unlike many other intellectual skills and virtues, however, I argue that educating for inquisitiveness cannot be achieved by exemplifying the virtue. Specifically, it cannot be achieved by exemplifying good questioning in the classroom. This conclusion runs counter to education research, in particular, concerning the 'Socratic Teaching' method (Lipman 1980; Portelli 1990; Fisher 2013). I argue that this should lead us to rethink certain strategies recommended in the literature and employed by practitioners using this method. In addition, the conclusion runs counter to recent and emerging research in ethics and epistemology concerning exemplarism (Zagzebski 2010). In this case, I argue that the case of inquisitiveness opens up interesting questions for the application of exemplarism in education.

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The Internalist Virtue Theory of Knowledge

Ralph Wedgwood, University of Southern California

Here is a definition of knowledge: for you to know a proposition *p* is for you to have an *outright belief* in *p* that is *correct* precisely *because* it manifests the *virtue of rationality*. This definition resembles Ernest Sosa's "virtue theory", except that (a) on this definition, the only virtue that must be manifested (at least to some degree) in all instances of knowledge is rationality, and (b) no reductive account of rationality is attempted – rationality is assumed to be an irreducibly normative notion. This definition is compatible with "internalism" about rationality, and with a form of "pragmatic encroachment" on the conditions of rational outright belief. An interpretation is given of this definition, and especially of the sense of

'because' that it involves. On this interpretation, this definition entails that both *safety* and *adherence* are necessary conditions on knowledge; it supports a kind of *contextualism* about terms like 'knowledge'; and it provides resources to defend safety, adherence, and contextualism, against some recent objections.

Responsibilist Epistemic Virtues as Skills

Sarah Wright, University of Georgia

My aim in this talk is to motivate the use of the skill model of virtue within responsibilist virtue epistemology. The analogy between skills (*techne*) and virtues has been a part of virtue ethics since the ancient Greeks. After distinguishing responsibilist and reliabilist virtue epistemologies, I will explore the ways that that skill analogy has been used within virtue reliabilism. I then turn to responsibilism and ask why the intellectual virtues that it advances have not been modeled on skills. I look to the arguments collected and put forward by Linda Zagzebski as the primary impediment to the use of the skill model in responsibilism. I then explore Julia Annas' responses to these arguments and explain her recently developed positive account of the moral virtues as a special kind of skill. Annas' skill model is aimed at the moral virtues; since the responsibilists' epistemic virtues are analogous to the moral virtues, the skill model of virtues is well suited to be applied to the epistemic virtues.

See You in 2019!

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