**Bled Philosophical Conferences**

Ethical Issues:
Theoretical & Applied

June 4-8, 2018

Ethical Issues: Theoretical & Applied

June 4-8, 2018

Organized by
Friderik Klampfer (Univ. of Maribor) & Justin Weinberg (Univ. of South Carolina)
with the collaboration of Danilo Šuster (Univ. of Maribor),
Nenad Misščević (Univ. of Maribor/CEU) & Matjaž Potrč (Univ. of Ljubljana)
Institutional Sponsors: Dept. of Philosophy, University of Maribor (Slovenia) and DAF,
Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy

*The conference is officially included in the program of the
activities of the Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy.*

History. Philosophical conferences at Bled (Slovenia) were initiated, on the suggestion by John Biro, in 1993, at first as a continuation of the IUC - Dubrovnik postgraduate course in philosophy but they gradually started a life of their own, with the help, first of Eugene Mills and then Mylan Engel, Jr. They typically take place during the first week of June and are dedicated to various topics in analytic philosophy.

AREA MAP

⭐ Kompas Hotel   ⭐ Hotel Lovec

Monday, June 4th

8:50-9:00	Welcoming Remarks
9:00-10:00	**Douglas Portmore** (Arizona State University) "Desert, Control, and Moral Responsibility"
10:05-11:05	**Mitja Sardoč** (Educational Research Institute) "Talents and Distributive Justice"
11:05-11:20	Break
11:20-12:20	**Elizabeth Edenberg** (Georgetown University) "Reasonableness: A Moral Threshold of Respect"
12:20-2:00	Lunch
2:00-3:00	**Nicolas Bommarito** (University at Buffalo) "On Understanding Evil"
3:00-3:15	Break
3:15-4:15	**Tomislav Bracanović** (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb) "Predictive Analytics and Theories of Privacy "
4:15-4:30	Break
4:30-5:30	**Colleen Murphy** (University of Illinois, U-C) "Judging the Justice of the Colombian Final Agreement"

	Tuesday, June 5th		**Wednesday, June 6th**
9:00-10:00	**Elizabeth Brake** (Arizona State University) "What, if Anything, Is Wrong with Price Gouging?"	9:00-10:00	**David Estlund** (Brown University) "Social Justice as Plural Requirement"
10:05-11:05	**Radim Bělohrad** (Masaryk University) "The Moral Status of Manipulation"	10:05-11:05	**Matjaž Potrč and Vojko Strahovnik** (University of Ljubljana) "Moral Seemings"
11:05-11:20	Break	11:05-11:20	Break
11:20-12:20	**Nenad Miščević** (Univ. of Maribor / CEU) "Response Dependence and Ethics"	11:20-12:20	**Lorraine Besser** (Middlebury College) "The Interesting and the Pleasant"
12:20-2:00	Lunch		
2:00-3:00	**Shamik Dasgupta** (UC Berkeley) "The Meta-Ethics of AI: Are Robots Beholden to Normative Joints?"		
3:00-3:15	Break		
3:15-4:15	**Rik Peels** (VU University Amsterdam) "Responsibility for Action and Responsibility for Belief"		
4:15-4:30	Break		
4:30-5:30	**Fiona Woollard** University of Southampton "What a Mother's Got To Do: A Moderate Account of Maternal Duties"		

FREE TIME!

	Thursday, June 7th			Friday, June 8th
9:00-10:00	**Rebecca Tuvel** (Rhodes College) "Racial Identity and Cultural Appropriation"		9:00-10:00	**Regina Rini** (York University) "Contingency Inattentiveness: Kantianism w/o Grandiose Metaphysics"
10:05-11:05	**Gene Mills** (Virginia Commonwealth) "A Defense of Ethical Flexitarianism"		10:05-11:05	**Simon C. May** (Florida State University) "Moral Demands in Ideal Theory"
11:05-11:20	Break		11:05-11:20	Break
11:20-12:20	**Harald Stelzer** (University of Graz) "Communitarianism and Right Wing Populism"		11:20-12:20	**Marko Jurjako** (University of Rijeka) "Mental Disorders, Harm, and Internal Reasons"
12:20-2:00	Lunch		12:20-2:00	Lunch
2:00-3:00	**Amy Berg** (Rhode Island College) "Bright Lines in Juvenile Justice"		2:00-3:00	**Alex King** (University of Buffalo) "Self Versus Other: Overridingness and the Case of Aesthetics"
3:00-3:15	Break		3:00-3:15	Break
3:15-4:15	**Friderik Klampfer** (University of Maribor) "Philosophical Expertise and Moral Intuition"		3:15-4:15	**Justin Weinberg** (University of South Carolina) "What's Offensive?"
4:15-4:30	Break		4:15-4:30	**Closing Remarks**
4:30-5:30	**Pekka Väyrynen** (University of Leeds) "Normative Explanation and Justification"			

7:30pm: Conference Dinner

ABSTRACTS

Radim Bělohrad, "The Moral Status of Manipulation"

Manipulation is an elusive concept. It seems there are many forms of manipulation that cannot be reduced to a single model. Naturally, there are several mutually incompatible theories of what manipulation amounts to. Assuming the moral status of manipulation results from the nature of the phenomenon, it is no wonder there is little consensus as to whether manipulation is always wrong. There are positions according to which it is a moralized concept and the immorality of manipulation is built into its definition. Other theories claim that although manipulation is not a moralized concept, it is still always wrong. Still other theories suggest there is nothing inherently wrong with manipulation; its moral status is derived from the goals of the manipulator. In my contribution, I will defend a particular concept of manipulation and its moral status. I will claim that manipulation essentially employs deception. This may seem to be an untenable position in the light of the fact that some scholars provide examples of manipulation in which the manipulated person is not provided any false or incorrect information. However, I will distinguish deception in content from deception in intention and claim that manipulation essentially involves the latter. This definition will then project into the moral assessment of manipulation. I will defend the view that manipulation is *prima facie* immoral, since it always involves an element of deception. But I will concede that in many cases its inherent immorality may be outweighed by positive consequences.

Amy Berg, "Bright Lines in Juvenile Justice"

In a recent series of decisions, the Supreme Court has categorically restricted the ways in which we may punish juveniles. Although dissenting justices are correct in sayin that this means some fully culpable juveniles will be insufficiently punished for heinous crimes, the Supreme Court's decisions are legally and morally justified. Our epistemic limitations mean we cannot correctly judge culpability, and the moral risks of overpunishing juveniles are too great. This shows us that a certain model of ideal justice is impossible: ideal laws cannot deliver precise justice. I discuss the limitations this places on ideal theory and conclude by examining how we might best make use of bright-line rules.

Lorraine Besser, "The Interesting and the Pleasant"

In both philosophical and psychological discussions of the good life, pleasure has come to have a value that is uncontestable. We can argue about how valuable it is, or how to define it, but very few question its status as a value and see what is pleasant as having fundamental value. But is the pleasant the only value like this? In this paper, I will argue that the fact that something is interesting is, on its own, valuable in the same sense in which feeling pleasure is valuable on its own. I begin by analyzing the interesting and differentiating it from the pleasant; I then defend the fundamental value of the interesting and explore how it enters into the good life.

Nicolas Bommarito, "On Understanding Evil"

People often find evil incomprehensible. When confronted with radical immorality we often say things like, "I just can't understand how someone could do that." I defend an explanation of why this can be morally virtuous. The nature of certain types of explanation make it

impossible for those with certain moral commitments. When those moral commitments are good, a lack of understanding can reflect well on one's moral character. This helps to distinguish this phenomenon from false friends like certain types of moral naivety, close mindedness, sanctimoniousness, and morally irrelevant types of understanding.

Tomislav Bracanović, "Predictive Analytics and Theories of Privacy "
The question to be addressed in the presentation is whether use of predictive analytics poses a threat to privacy, as it is frequently suggested in both scholarly publications and the media. The first part of the presentation is a basic description of predictive analytics (various techniques of analyzing large amounts of data in order predict future events, human behavior and preferences included) and some of its best-known uses (like targeted advertising, crime prevention and political campaigning). In the second part of the presentation, selected uses of predictive analytics are analyzed against a number of theories of privacy, proposed by both legal scholars (Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis [1890], William Prosser [1960] and Richard Posner [1978]) and philosophers (Judith Jarvis Thomson [1975], James Rachels [1975] and Jeffrey Reiman [1976]). It will be argued that none of these theories provides a solid ground for the claim that predictive analytics poses a threat to privacy as such or – alternatively – to some of its constitutive elements (like property rights, personhood or the capacity for intimate relationships). In the third and final part of the presentation it is discussed why the language of privacy and individual rights may not be the best tool for conceptualizing moral and legal threats associated with predictive analytics and related technologies.

Elizabeth Brake "What, if Anything, Is Wrong with Price Gouging?"
What, if anything, is wrong with price gouging? Defenders of its permissibility argue that it benefits the vulnerable by increasing supply of scarce necessities; in response, it has been criticized as exploitative, inequitable, and vicious. In this paper, I respond to defenses of price gouging by arguing for its moral wrongness and legal prohibition, but I do so without relying on charges of exploitation, inequity, or poor character. What is primarily wrong with price gouging is that it violates a duty of easy rescue, and it would do so even were it equitable and not exploitative. While legal enforcement of duties of easy rescue is controversial in general, a special case can be made that a legally enforceable duty of easy rescue requires sellers of basic necessities to refrain from price gouging. Consumers have a claim to easy rescue on the basis of induced reliance, reasonably generated expectations which are disappointed to their detriment. This account allows us to distinguish, morally, corporate price gouging from the activities of lone entrepreneurs. It also illuminates the grounds of legally enforceable duties of easy rescue and of price controls in general.

Shamik Dasgupta, "The Meta-Ethics of AI: Are Robots Beholden to Normative Joints?"
How should we treat artificial intelligences? How should they treat us? These questions were once the province of speculative fiction, but with the technological progress of recent years they now loom very much on the horizon. I don't have answers to these questions. Instead, my thesis is that there are, in a sense, no answers out there to discover—it is more a matter of deciding on, or inventing, an ethical code. The idea that ethics is a matter of decision or invention is associated with anti-realist views such as non-cognitivism, error-theory, and

and constructivism. But my thesis won't rest on such views. I will assume a realist picture on which there are mind-independent ethical facts that our ethical beliefs (by and large) successfully track. Still, I'll argue that these facts don't fix an ethics of artificial intelligence.

Elizabeth Edenberg, "Reasonableness: A Moral Threshold of Respect"
What is the purpose of qualifying as reasonable for political liberalism? Reasonable pluralism should be accommodated, I argue, because the reasonableness signifies that a basic moral threshold has been met. This threshold signifies that the reasonable person respects herself and her fellow citizens as free and equal and, in light of this respect, she seeks to engage in fair terms of cooperation in society. In this paper, I defend what I call the bifurcation thesis: reasonableness should be used to designate a moral threshold has been met and this threshold is independent of whether or not citizens embrace Rawlsian legitimacy. I will argue that disambiguating the moral qualification of reasonableness from Rawls's principle of legitimacy is important in order to expand political liberalism as a broader framework within which alternate reasonable principles of justice and, I suggest, legitimacy can be debated.

David Estlund, "Social Justice as Plural Requirement"
Many accept that there is a tight connection between moral requirement and ability, as in the slogan that "ought implies can." Suppose that this is correct. Next, there seem to be requirements, broadly moral in some way, on societies. For example, it is hard to deny that societies are required to be just, and that injustice is some kind of broadly moral deficiency. There is a general challenge, then, how to understand the idea of a requirement, broadly moral, that applies to a set of agents and their actions, even when the set is not an agent. A desideratum of such an account, I will suppose, is that the notion of non-agential requirement is connected to some counterpart of the idea of ability. I will use the term, "feasibility," to name this notion: a counterpart to agential ability, but applicable to sets of agents, and acts which there is reason to think are, in some way, collectively required. In that case, and plausibly, something is a requirement of social justice only if it is feasible. My aim in this talk is to explain how this is a puzzling and poorly understood issue, propose an account of non-agential "plural requirement," along with an interpretation of "plural ability," such that it is plausible and illuminating that plural requirement implies plural ability, a plural non-agential counterpart to "ought implies can."

Marko Jurjako, "Mental Disorders, Harm, and Internal Reasons"
It seems to be a commonplace that the notion of mental disorder is at least partly value-laden. According to this line of thought, a condition that a person has is not a disorder if it is not harmful to that person. The relevant notion of harm can be spelled out in many ways. It usually refers to something that negatively affects a person's well-being. However, philosophy of psychiatry lacks a consensus on what constitutes a person's well-being and when it is sufficiently reduced by a condition to merit the label of mental disorder. In addition, it is not clear what kind of considerations can legitimately qualify a harmful condition as a mental disorder. I will approach this issue using the model of internal reasons as developed by Bernard Williams and others after him. The investigation will be twofold. First, I investigate how much the model can illuminate the normative aspect that harm imports to the notion of a disorder. In general, we can say that judging that some condition is harmful involves the

judgment that it is undesirable. On Williams' view, this claim is explicated in terms of rational routes; I have a reason not to desire to be in some condition only if I would reach that desire by rational deliberative route from my initial desires. This notion of a practical reason captures some aspects of the role the notion of harm plays in psychiatry. For instance, one of the major reasons why homosexuality was removed from the second edition of the Diagnostic statistical manual of mental disorders (in 1973) is because it normally does not cause subjective distress to a person. Second, applying the internal reasons model to mental disorders exposes some of the often-noticed weak points of this model of reasons. For instance, it might have problems capturing the undesirability of disorders that involve profound lack of insight. Accordingly, no amount of rational deliberation, without making the conditional fallacy, could lead to the judgment that the condition is undesirable. In that case, however, I argue that the notion of a rational route could benefit from incorporating an objective notion of function that explains when capacities underlying rationality are malfunctioning. From this perspective, we can say that the condition is harmful because it is either judged by a person as undesirable or because it impairs capacities for rational thinking that are necessary for being an agent.

Alex King, "Self Versus Other: Overridingness and the Case of Aesthetics"
Whether moral reasons always override or outweigh non-moral reasons is a heated debate in moral theory. Aesthetic reasons have, so far, played almost no role in this debate, which takes self-regarding reasons (such as desire satisfaction or personal well-being) to be the major or only real candidate to override moral reasons. These debates thus see the conflict as fundamentally between self and other – what we can allow ourselves and what we owe to others. Aesthetic reasons don't fit snugly along these existing lines. They're not egocentric in the same way that self-interested reasons are – in either the artist's or the audience's case. But aesthetic reasons also are not primarily concerned with how others fare. This paper thus defends two theses. First, some aesthetic reasons very plausibly override some moral reasons (and even some moral obligations). Second and more importantly, taking account of aesthetic reasons can helpfully shift the self-versus-other paradigm of the overridingness debate and thereby move it forward.

Friderik Klampfer, "Philosophical Expertise and Moral Intuition"
In the last two decades or so, philosophical thought experimentation, once the dominant philosophical method, has increasingly come under attack. At least some of this rebellion is fueled by the insights of empirical sciences that study psychological processes underlying ordinary moral judgment. What these suggest is that ordinary people's TE-generated linguistic, epistemic, modal, metaphysical and moral intuitions are not only fairly incoherent and messy, but often differ, to a larger or smaller degree, from those shared by (most) professional philosophers.

In response to this criticism, some philosophers have developed what has since become known as 'the expertise defense'. Based on analogies with natural and social sciences, from mathematics and physics to law and linguistics, they attempt to secure the evidential value of philosophers' intuitions, as opposed to uninformed lay people's intuitions, by grounding it in special philosophical expertise.

In the paper, I challenge this line of defense of philosophers' reliance on intuitions by focusing on intuitive moral judgments.

I first compile a checklist of epistemic advantages that philosophical training is supposed to confer on a moral philosopher, from conceptual mastery and better reasoning skills to thought-experimental know-how and argument analysis and assessment, and show that while some of them possibly confer some such advantage to philosophers over lay people, none of them plausibly renders philosophers expert moral *intuiters*. But if so, we have little reason to keep treating them as even prima facie, let alone conclusive, evidence for the truth of contested moral propositions.

Simon C. May, "Moral Demands in Ideal Theory"
I argue that the nature of moral demands provides support for Rawlsian ideal theory (i.e., strict compliance theory). In any cooperative scheme, individuals have standing (as participants) to demand that other participants abide by the rules of the scheme. But moral demands do not simply assert the existence of a moral duty on the part of the addressee. In addition, they implicitly link this duty to the addresser's own default duties of normal cooperation with the addressee, i.e., the duties that the addresser has with respect to the addressee, on the assumption that the addressee abides by the rules of the scheme, whatever these may be. By generalization, the participants in the scheme possess default duties of normal cooperation with each other that must ultimately be worked out on the basis of an assumption of strict compliance. I contrast my "deontic" interpretation of Rawlsian ideal theory with "teleological" interpretations that rely on the concept of a realistic utopia.

Gene Mills "A Defense of Ethical Flexitarianism"
The best arguments for ethical vegetarianism hinge on principles linking the admitted wrongness of factory farming to that of buying its products. All the principles on offer confer wrongness, though, on buying virtually anything; so I argue. This consequence is absurd; the principles are false, and ethical vegetarianism lacks adequate support.

The failure of arguments for ethical vegetarianism does not, however, vindicate "casual carnivorism," according to which most routine purchases of animal products are morally unproblematic. I defend *ethical flexitarianism*, according to which many and perhaps most purchases of animal products—but not as many as ethical vegetarians would say—are morally unjustified: "subjectively impermissible," whether or not they are objectively impermissible.

The argument is roughly as follows. Suppose you confront a "torture lottery," in which buying any ticket gives you a small but non-zero chance of being responsible for the torture of an innocent being, but in which not all tickets confer the *same* chance. I argue that it can be and often is (subjectively) morally permissible to enter such a lottery, if you would incur a morally significant cost by failing to enter; but it is morally obligatory in that case to buy a ticket with the lowest chance of "winning," if buying such a ticket rather than one with a higher chance of winning would not itself incur any morally significant cost. I argue that almost every time we buy anything, we buy a ticket for a torture lottery; and the moral principles just bruited, combined with relevant empirical facts, yield ethical flexitarianism as a result.

Colleen Murphy, "Judging the Justice of the Colombian Final Agreement"

Societies emerging from periods of conflict or repression characteristically try to address past wrongs using processes other than criminal punishment. There is, however, deep disagreement as to whether justice is achieved with alternate measures such as amnesty or a truth commission. What are the appropriate standards of justice to use when evaluating various responses to wrongdoing in transitional circumstances? To answer this question, I first articulate the circumstances of justice characterizing transitional societies, and contrast these with the circumstances of stable democracies. I then argue that justice in transitional circumstances is not aimed at giving perpetrators what they deserve. It is rather aimed at transforming a society, and doing so in a just manner by treating victims and perpetrators fairly.

After articulating my general account of transitional justice, I turn to the Colombian peace process with FARC. I first show that Colombia satisfies all of the circumstances of transitional justice. Thus, the justice of the Colombian Final Agreement depends on the extent to which the outlined transitional justice processes contribute to societal transformation and treat victims and perpetrators fairly and appropriately. I argue that there are two reasons for optimism about the justice of such processes. The transitional justice processes outlined are comprehensive, which is important to ensure victims and perpetrators are treated appropriately. The Agreement also deals with structural inequality, which is critical for transformation. I end with two reasons for caution in assuming that these potential contributions to transitional justice will in fact be realized.

Rik Peels, "Responsibility for Action and Responsibility for Belief"

Several philosophers have argued that we should explain the responsibility that we bear for our beliefs in terms of our ability to *influence* what we believe by gathering evidence, working on our intellectual virtues and vices, and other actions. This is because we do not seem to *choose* our beliefs, but rather we seem to choose to *do* things that make a difference to what we believe. Thus, responsibility for belief derives from responsibility for action. This line of thought has been pursued by Anthony Booth, Sandy Goldberg, Anne Meylan, Nikolaj Nottelmann, and myself. This suggests that responsibility for belief supervenes on responsibility for action. But here is the worry: whether or not we are blameworthy for an *action* often depends on whether or not we are blameworthy for the *beliefs* on the basis of which we act. Sometimes, we are responsible for what we do or fail to do because *we should have known better*. So, it seems in at least some cases responsibility for action derives from responsibility for belief. So, does responsibility for action depend on responsibility for belief or vice versa? Or are they mutually dependent? If so, does that not lead to a vicious regress for responsibility? In this paper I seek answers to these questions.

Douglas W. Portmore, "Desert, Control, and Moral Responsibility"

I argue that a necessary condition for being morally responsible for φ-ing is having control over whether one φs. For I argue that in order for one to be morally responsible for φ-ing, it must be fitting for one to feel pride (or guilt) for φ-ing, and I argue that for it to be fitting for one to feel pride (or guilt) for φ-ing, one must deserve to experience the pleasantness (or unpleasantness) of that feeling in virtue of having φ-ed. But since no one deserves to

experience any pleasantness (or unpleasantness) in virtue of something that wasn't under his or her control, control must be necessary for moral responsibility—at least, for moral responsibility in the accountability sense.

Matjaž Potrč and Vojko Strahovnik, "Moral Seemings"
We start the investigation of moral judgments and moral seemings by an analysis of beliefs which turn out to be commitment states. According to the view of cognitivist expressivism beliefs come in two kinds: (1) descriptive or factual is-beliefs (that p is the case) and (2) normative ought-beliefs (that p should, ought to be the case). We propose to work within this framework, although much of what we have to say should be neutral or compatible with other views about moral judgments.

Ordinary or factual is-beliefs rely upon epistemic situatedness, in respect to available evidence (the entirety of evidence) and in respect to the agent's deep epistemic sensibility. The goal of factual belief fixation is truth. Several forms of rationality lead to this goal in a means-to-ends manner: 4. Complete reliable veridicality (believing only what is true), 3. Objective rationality (believing what is objectively very likely to be true), 2. Subjective rationality (believing only what is subjectively very likely to be true), 1. Experiential rationality (believing what appears to the agent with respect to his seemings: that's a kind of rationality entertained by any agent). Each of the lower levels is integrated into higher levels.

Moral beliefs are normative ought-beliefs (that p ought to be the case). They rely upon moral, normative situatedness, in respect to possible moral evidence and in respect to moral agents' moral sensibility. (Those inclined towards moral realism would have no problem with such a framework and talk about the moral properties and moral facts as specifically moral evidence, while irrealists would put more emphasis onto the second aspects, i.e. moral sensitivity and would refuse to talk about specific moral evidence.) The goal of normative belief fixation is aptness, fittingness or relevance, in respect to morally relevant reasons, categorically experienced in moral judgment. Several forms of (moral) rationality (or possible agentive levels) lead to this goal in a means-to-ends manner: 4. Complete moral rationality (believing only what is morally relevant or having true moral judgments), 3. Objective moral rationality (believing only what is very likely to be objectively morally relevant), 2. Subjective moral rationality (believing only what is very likely to be subjectively morally relevant), 1. Experiential moral rationality (believing only what appears to the agent in respect to overall moral seemings). Each of the lower levels is a part of the higher level. Moral seemings as a form of experiential moral rationality support subjective moral rationality. Due to their basic support role in ought-belief (or other kinds of moral belief) formation they are naturally treated by the agent in a steadfast manner.

Relevance (aptness, fittingness) is the goal of belief formation in accordance with the available moral reasons. Moral seemings are recognition of reasons, they are a reaction to reasons. Another very important aspect of moral judgment is that moral reasons are consciously experienced or effective from one's cognitive/moral background.

Regina Rini "Contingency Inattentiveness: Kantianism without Grandiose Metaphysics"
It is a philosophical truism that we must think of others as moral agents, not merely as causal or statistical objects. But why? I argue that this results from the only satisfactory resolution

of an antinomy between our experience of morality as necessarily binding on the will, and our knowledge that particular moral beliefs originate in radically contingent histories. A satisfying resolution – one which avoids both mysterianism and impractical skepticism – is offered by appreciating how social interaction both vindicates and constrains morality's bind on the will. On this account, the practice of moral agency is fundamentally social. I then model an attitude toward our causal nature on sociologist Erving Goffman's concept of 'civil inattention'; our social practice of moral agency requires that we give minimal attention to the contingent origins of moral judgments in ourselves and others. Understood this way, seeing ourselves as moral agents requires avoiding appeal to causal aetiology to settle substantive moral disagreement.

Mitja Sardoč, "Talents and Distributive Justice"
For much of its history, the notion of talent has been associated with the idea of 'careers open to talent'. Its emancipatory promise of upward social mobility has ultimately radically transformed the distribution of advantaged social positions and has had a lasting influence on the very idea of social status itself. Besides its inextricable link with equality of educational opportunity, the notion of talent came to be associated also with some of the most pressing contemporary issues as diverse as the 'war for talent', brain drain, immigration policies, talent management, global meritocracy, the 'excellence gap', the 'ownership' of natural resources, ability taxation etc.

Nevertheless, while central to egalitarian conceptions of distributive justice, the notion of talent remains to a large extent absent from the voluminous literature on these [and related] issues. Unlike concepts traditionally associated with distributive justice, e.g. fairness, (in)equality, desert, equality of opportunity as well as justice itself, the notion of talent has received only limited examination. At the same time, several egalitarian scholars started to perceive talents as a form of unfair advantage as holding a particular talent is arbitrary from a moral perspective. On this basis, some proponents of egalitarianism have derived the conclusion that individuals may not deserve the results of the 'lottery of birth' and have equated talents [as a form of 'natural' inequality] with 'social' inequality.

This paper discusses some of the most pressing problems and challenges arising out of a reductionist understanding of talents' anatomy, a distorted characterization of their overall distributive value as well as talents' non-voluntaristic nature. The introductory part presents the 'standard' horizon on the discussion of talent and the problems raised by individuals' 'natural' differences (what, if anything, makes talents problematic from an egalitarian perspective). The next section identifies the basic dimensions of talents. Part three challenges the moral equivalence between 'natural' and 'social' inequalities that is part of the foundations of egalitarian conceptions of distributive justice. The final part outlines two of the fundamental problems that call into question the coherence of egalitarian conceptions of social (in)equality.

Harald Stelzer "Communitarianism and Right Wing Populism"
In the presentation I would like to discuss the close relation between populism and communitarianism, as they are normative particularistic, cultural closed, and historical romantic. Furthermore communitarian thinking could be used to fill the ideological gap that often is characteristic for right-wing populist movements and parties. It is therefore of great

importance to criticize communitarian positions and their underlying assumptions to foreclose their use for the legitimization of populism. I will do so by first referring to some of the most important dimensions of communitarianism (critique of liberal atomism, individual identity, critique of liberal neutrality, public participation, common good, political virtues, normative particularism). I will then show that communitarianism as well as right-wing populism can be understood as a reaction towards changing condition through modernization and globalization. I will analyze some of the character traits of populist movements and parties and show how closely linked they are towards communitarianism. I will close by reviewing communitarianism and populism as unfit to answer the existing problems of modern, heterogeneous societies.

Rebecca Tuvel "Racial Identity and Cultural Appropriation"
This paper considers the popular objection that racial crossing engages in cultural appropriation, and is therefore morally wrong. I argue first that mainstream discourse has lost hold of the concept of cultural appropriation, which is unfairly wielded against innocuous or even salutary instances of cultural borrowing. Second, I critically evaluate different instances of cultural crossing and consider what makes some, but not others, objectionable forms of appropriation. Borrowing from Talia Bettcher's understanding of ethical first-person authority, I further argue we can normatively assess the authenticity of people's racial and cultural self-identities via their attitudes, values and commitments.

Pekka Väyrynen, "Normative Explanation and Justification"
Normative explanations—of why things are wrong, good, unfair, etc.—are ubiquitous in ordinary normative practice and in moral, political, and legal theory. Yet there is much less work on what makes for a correct normative explanation than on what makes for a correct scientific explanation. I argue that normative explanation is subject to a justification condition: roughly, a correct explanation of why a normative fact holds must in some way identify features that justify certain responses. This condition fits well with various theories of normative reasons, various characterizations of normative justification, and our ordinary normative practice. This condition, though distinctive of normative explanation, also doesn't make normative explanation discontinuous with non-causal explanations in other domains: it can be captured as a special case of certain general features of explanation.

Justin Weinberg, "What's Offensive?"
I argue that we should understand offensiveness as a property that elicits a response in the offended party consisting of related affective and evaluative components of specific kinds. To offend someone is to cause them to experience at least one of a related set of negative feelings, feelings which are explained by a rejection of their judgment. There are several virtues to this account of the offensive. First, it accommodates a variety of kinds of offense while keeping "offensive" from losing its distinctive content. Second, since the experience of negative feelings is not necessarily harmful, it allows us to distinguish clearly and in a non ad hoc way between harm and offense. Third, the evaluative component of offense explains why most non-human animals are unable to be offended, though most of them can be harmed. Fourth, it helps to make clearer the basis for objecting to and regulating offensive behavior.

While offensiveness itself is not a harm, on my proposed view, some things which are offensive are also harmful, and some experiences of offensiveness can cause harm. Distinguishing between that which is merely offensive and that which is both offensive and productive of harm, and using that distinction as a practical guide, should lead to clearer and more consensus-friendly public thinking about reactions to what's offensive.

Fiona Woollard, "What a Mother's Got To Do: A Moderate Account of Maternal Duties"
Popular discussion of maternal behaviour often treats mothers and pregnant women as if they have a defeasible duty to perform any action that might benefit their child. I have argued elsewhere that this understanding of maternal duty is mistaken and has bad effects on women's wellbeing. Nonetheless, I do not want to suggest that mothers have *no* maternal duties. This paper is part of a project to develop an alternative moderate account of the duties of pregnant women and mothers to their offspring. I explore two questions: (1) Should we adopt a *sufficiency model* of maternal duties, according to which mothers have a defeasible duty to do enough to benefit their child? (2) When, if ever, does a mother or pregnant woman have a defeasible duty to perform a specific action for the sake of the child? The two questions are connected because, as I will argue, there are some cases where intuitively mothers have defeasible duties to perform specific actions and sufficiency models are not able to recognise these duties. That leaves us with a choice: to further reform our understanding of maternal duties or to reject sufficiency models.