



Oddelek za filozofijo, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Mariboru in Društvo za Analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor and Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Science

Nenad v naših mislih

Nenad in Our Minds



Filozofska konferenca v čast Nenadu Miščeviću
Philosophical Conference in Honor of Nenad Miščević

27. in 28. maj, 2025
27th and 28th of May 2025



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Seznam sodelujočih: List of participants:

- Andrej Ule, University of Ljubljana
- Bojan Borstner, University of Maribor
- Boran Berčič, University of Rijeka
- Boris Vezjak, University of Maribor
- Borut Trpin, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy LMU München and University of Maribor
- Božidar Kante, University of Maribor
- Danilo Šuster, University of Maribor
- Elvio Baccarini, University of Rijeka
- Filip Grgić, Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb
- Friderik Klampfer, University of Maribor
- István Bodnár, Eötvös University, Budapest and Central European University, Vienna
- Janez Bregant, University of Maribor
- Majda Trobok, University of Rijeka
- Martin Justin, University of Maribor
- Matija Rajter, University of Rijeka
- Matjaž Potrč, University of Ljubljana
- Miljana Milojević, University of Belgrade
- Mitja Sardoč, University of Ljubljana
- Mojca Küplen, University of Tennessee
- Mylan Engel, Northern Illinois University
- Nenad Smokrović, University of Rijeka
- Niko Šetar, University of Maribor
- Olga Markič, University of Ljubljana
- Pierre Jacob, Paris, CNRS - The French National Centre for Scientific Research
- Simon Rippon, Central European University, Vienna
- Tadej Todorović, University of Maribor
- Vanda Božičević, Bergen Community College
- Slobodan Perović, University of Belgrade
- Vojislav Božičković, University of Belgrade
- Vojko Strahovnik, University of Ljubljana

Organizacijski odbor: Organizing Committee:

red. prof. dr. Bojan Borstner
izr. prof. dr. Janez Bregant
doc. dr. Smiljana Gartner
asist. dr. Tadej Todorović
asist. dr. Urška Martinc
asist. Martin Justin



Program/Programme

27. 5. 2025

Predavalnica 2.11/Room 2.11 – Predsedujoči/Chair: Janez Bregant

- 09.00–09.30** **Otvoritev konference, uvodni govori/Opening Ceremony Speeches**
09.30–10.00 Vanda Božičević (Paramus), Bojan Borstner (Maribor), Boran Berčič (Reka):
Nenad Miščević in razvoj filozofskih oddelkov v Zadru, Mariboru in na Reki/Nenad
Miščević and the Development of Departments of Philosophy in Zadar, Maribor, and
Rijeka
10.00–10.45 Pierre Jacob (Pariz): Metarepresentational Intuitions
10.45–11.30 Matjaž Potrč (Ljubljana): Memories of Nenad: Paris, Semantics, and Shared Intellectual
Pursuits
11.30–11.45 **Odmor/Break**
11.45–12.30 Nenad Smokrović (Reka): Nenad on Graded Rationality
12.30–13.15 Danilo Šuster (Maribor): Understanding and Disagreement: Nenad on Philosophical
Divisions
13.15–14.30 **Kosilo/Lunch**

Predavalnica 2.11/Room 2.11 (Section 1) – Predsedujoči/Chair: Tadej Todorović

- 14.30–15.15** Boran Berčič, Matija Rajter (Reka): Nenad, Amoebas, and Conceptual Engineering
15.15–16.00 Andrej Ule (Ljubljana): Nenad Miščević and John Searle on Collective Intentionality
16.00–16.15 **Odmor/Break**
16.15–17.00 Boris Vezjak (Maribor): A-rationality and Semantic Noise in Non-analytic Philosophy
19.30 **Večerja/Dinner**

Predavalnica 2.10/Room 2.10 (Section 2)– Predsedujoči/Chair: Danilo Šuster

- 14.30–15.15** Mylan Engel (DeKalb): Armchair Epistemology: Nenad on Knowledge
and Armchair Veritic Luck
15.15–16.00 Filip Grgić (Zagreb): Truth and Action
16.00–16.45 Olga Markič (Ljubljana): Nenad Miščević on Philosophy of Cognitive Science
16.45–17.00 **Odmor/Break**
17.00–17.45 Friderik Klampfer (Maribor): The True Remedy of War: From Individual to Institutional
Pacifism... and Back
17.45–18.30 Mitja Sardoč (Ljubljana): The Moral Quandaries of Just War Rationality:
A Rejoinder to Nenad
19.30 **Večerja/Dinner**



28. 5. 2025

Predavalnica 2.11/Room 2.11 (Section 1)– Predsedujoči/Chair: Smiljana Gartner

- 09.00–09.45** István Bodnár (Budimpešta/Dunaj): Aristotle: Some beginnings
09.50–10.35 Mojca Küplen (Knoxville): Therapeutic Self-knowledge in Narrative Art
10.35–11.20: Tadej Todorović, Janez Bregant, (Maribor): Sacrificing Natural Kinds: Fodor's Legacy and the Unity of Science
11.20–11.35 **Odmor/Break**
11.35–12.20 Vojko Strahovnik (Ljubljana): The Structure of Epistemic Virtuousness
12.20–13.05 Božidar Kante (Maribor): Mišević and Levinson on Aesthetic Properties
13.10 **Zaključek konference/Conference Conclusion**
13.15–14.30 **Kosilo/Lunch**

Predavalnica 2.12/Room 2.12 (Section 2) – Predsedujoči/Chair: Mylan Engel

- 09.00–09.45** Martin Justin, Borut Trpin (Maribor, München/Maribor): Coherence, Belief Updating, and Epistemic Luck: A Computational Exploration
09.50–10.35 Simon Rippon (Dunaj): On Seriousness in Ethics and Metaphysics
10.35–11.20 Elvio Baccarini (Reka): Are 'Cultural Appropriation' and 'Insult' Useful Concepts for Politics of Equality
11.20–11.35 **Odmor/Break**
11.35–12.20 Bojan Borstner, Niko Šetar (Maribor): On Virtues, Vices, and Truth
13.10 **Zaključek konference/Conference Conclusion**
13.15–14.30 **Kosilo/Lunch**



Knjižica povzetkov/Book of Abstracts

Andrej Ule, University of Ljubljana

Nenad Miščević and John Searle on Collective Intentionality

I discuss Nenad Miščević's criticism of John Searle's concept of collective intentionality. Searle considers collective intentionality as we-intentionality, which is biologically primitive and a basic form of intentionality, irreducible to singular I-intentionality. Miščević criticizes Searle's thesis on the primitiveness of we-intentions, which Searle presented in his book on the construction of social reality. I believe Searle and Miščević have some partial rights and some partial non-rights in their views on collective intentionality. However, they both neglected basic inter-subjective and pre-intentional potentials of sociality, which may causally and cognitively lead to the spontaneous appearance of suitable cases of collective intentionality among the people who are involved in a common social situation (although Searle considers it partially in one of his earlier texts).

Keywords: collective intentionality, we-intentionality, social reality, irreducibility, potentials of sociality.

Bojan Borstner, University of Maribor

Niko Šetar, University of Maribor

Nenad on Virtues, Vices, and Truth

This talk will walk in the footsteps of Nenad's path in virtue epistemology and adjacent domains. We shall begin with his move toward a strong virtue epistemology along with the pertaining classification of virtues, emphasizing the role of curiosity as central to epistemic inquiry. We will then pursue this latter path, tangentially recapping his work on the response-dependence view of color, to arrive at a deeper disambiguation on the kinds and statuses of curiosity and how it features, as a motivator virtue, in Nenad's view of virtue epistemology, as well as finally at how curiosity and response-dependence conjoin to bestow value on beliefs and propositions obtained through epistemic inquiry. In conclusion, we will round up the opus of his work by Nenad's view of self-inquisitiveness as another fundamental, virtue-organizing concept that completes his framework of epistemic virtue and value.

Keywords: virtue epistemology, epistemic value, curiosity, self-inquisitiveness, response-dependence.



Boran Berčić, University of Rijeka

Matija Rajter, University of Rijeka

Nenad, Amoebas, and Conceptual Engineering

In the discussion about conceptual analysis and a priori knowledge, Nenad often used the example of amoebas. There was a cartoon about an amoeba family: amoeba dad, amoeba mom, and amoeba kids. People, mostly kids, I guess, were watching this cartoon, following the plot, relationships between members of the family, etc. However, in reality, amoebas are single-cell organisms. They do not have sexes, and they do not have children; they reproduce by simple cell division. Is there anything in the concept of an amoeba that prevents us from vividly imagining such a family of amoebas? Not really. Nenad was using this example to show how misleading our intuitions can be, and how wrong we can be in our conceptual analysis and a priori knowledge. His moral was that the analysis of concept *X* simply amounts to the analysis of *X* itself. For this reason, philosophy cannot be seen as an a priori analysis of our concepts. This insight can be applied to the current discussion about conceptual engineering. What we want to improve in our analysis is not the concept of *X*. It is rather *X* itself. Philosophers, lawyers, and social activists do not want to improve the concept of marriage; what they want to improve is marriage itself. For this reason, we must abandon the idea that philosophy is and should be regarded as conceptual engineering. If we believe that conceptual engineering is what we do, then we simply have the wrong beliefs about what we do.

Keywords: Nenad, amoebas, conceptual analysis, conceptual engineering, nature of philosophy.

Boris Vezjak, University of Maribor

A-Rationality and Semantic Noise in Non-analytic Philosophy

In his discussion on the difference between continental and analytic philosophy, Nenad Miščević (2014) points out that a-rationality is an important approach in the former and rationality in the latter. Intellectual strategy of such a philosophical account within continental philosophy is the following: (a) there is an a-rational aspect of human existence (desire, passion, and the like), (b) this aspect, if accepted as an implicit methodological principle, and (c) the cognitive style, the language, style and the method of studying an a-rational domain should follow the language, style and the manner of domain itself. I will question some of the claims: for instance, do we risk oversimplification by stating that continental philosophy adopts *a-rationality* as a methodological principle? The idea that the method should mirror the domain (i.e., a-rationality should dictate an a-rational cognitive style) is maybe non-sequitur. Philosophical analysis of *X* does not need to become *X* itself; rather, it can still use logical reasoning to examine these domains.

Keywords: analytic philosophy, continental philosophy, rationality, a-rationality, method, philosophical analysis.



Božidar Kante, University of Maribor

Miščević and Levinson on Aesthetic Properties

Nenad Miščević's work on response-dependent properties refines the concept of response-dependence by addressing its role in objectivity, realism, and the nature of human cognition. Response-dependent properties are those properties whose instantiation depends on human responses, but Miščević argues that such properties are not merely subjective but are objectively grounded in stable, human-relative dispositions tied to our cognitive and perceptual systems. He emphasizes that they are objectively anchored in our shared biological and cognitive makeup. Leaning on thinkers like Sibley and Levinson, he argues that aesthetic qualities (e.g., graceful) depend on perceptual engagement but are anchored in objective features of artworks (e.g., composition, texture). He argues against reductionism (aesthetic properties as response-dependent are not reducible to purely physical or non-normative terms) and relativism (while acknowledging cultural variation, he argues that core response-dependent properties are universal due to shared human biology). The critical points of Miščević's theory are: (1) circularity: critics argue that defining "normal observers" or "ideal conditions" presupposes the very properties being explained; (2) cultural variation: while Miščević acknowledges cultural influences, some argue his framework underplays the role of social construction in shaping responses; (3) epistemic access: How do we verify "idealized conditions" without prior knowledge of the properties in question?

Levinson posits that aesthetic properties supervene on non-aesthetic properties (e.g., shapes, colors, textures) but are not reducible to them. This means that two objects with identical non-aesthetic features cannot differ aesthetically, but aesthetic qualities arise holistically from the arrangement and interaction of these features. Levinson distinguishes between response-dependent and non-response-dependent aesthetic properties: (1) formal/structural aesthetic properties (e.g., unity, balance): these are relatively objective and depend on perceivable configurations; (2) expressive/evaluative aesthetic properties (e.g., melancholy, garishness): these are response-dependent, involving emotional or affective reactions. For instance, a musical piece's "sadness" depends on its capacity to evoke specific feelings in listeners; (3) phenomenal holism: Levinson argues that aesthetic properties are "higher-order ways of appearing," emerging from lower-order sensory properties. This "overall phenomenal impression" blends perception, emotion, and conceptual engagement. Levinson rejects a rigid dichotomy between response-dependent and non-response-dependent aesthetic properties. Instead, he proposes a continuum: (1) non-response-dependent: formal properties (e.g., symmetry) that are perceptually discernible without strong subjective input; (2) moderately response-dependent: expressive properties (e.g., dynamism) tied to culturally informed interpretations; (3) strongly response-dependent: evaluative properties (e.g., beauty), which hinge on subjective valuation but still rely on objective bases. This framework accommodates both the objectivity of structural features and the subjectivity of emotional resonance. The critical points of Levinson's theory are: (1) overextension of supervenience: critics question whether supervenience fully explains the relationship between aesthetic properties and non-aesthetic properties, given the role of interpretation; (2) evaluative neutrality: some argue that all aesthetic properties inherently carry evaluative force, challenging Levinson's separation of descriptive and evaluative components.

Conclusion: Miščević aligns with Levinson's emphasis on perceptual holism in aesthetics but adds a stronger realist framework, grounding response-dependence in human nature.

Keywords: supervenience, response-dependent property, evaluative aesthetic properties, phenomenal holism, informed observer.



Danilo Šuster, University of Maribor

Understanding and Disagreement: Nenad on Philosophical Divisions

It is almost impossible to find a clear formulation of the analytic-continental contrasts. A neutral characterization is sometimes proposed: analytic and continental philosophies are historical traditions featuring causal histories and webs of resemblances (Glock 2008). Miščević (2011; 2016) provides an original and intriguing account of the Continental-Analytic Rift. According to his big picture, the modern Continental side subscribes to the four "breakup" principles from the early modern and the contemporary analytic thought: (i) The anthropological and historical is deeply ontological; (ii) The central element of human mind is a-rational; (iii) The basic reality of the world is akin to the a-rational element of the human mind; (iv) The cognitive style, the language-style, and the method of studying a domain D should follow the language-style and the manner of D itself. He is also interested in bridge heading: prospects for a joint, continental-analytic framework. I am more skeptical about this project, but I explore the idea of using the four theses to conceptualize the divide in terms of a contemporary (analytic) framework of deep disagreement.

Keywords: analytic philosophy, continental philosophy, breakup principles, a-rationality, deep disagreement.

Elvio Baccarini, University of Rijeka

Are 'Cultural Appropriation' and 'Insult' Useful Concepts for Politics of Equality?

The motivation for this paper is the ambition to reaffirm egalitarian liberalism as the proper framework for the protection of all individuals within society, in opposition to recent movements and theories that propose allegedly emancipatory policies in support of traditionally discriminated and dominated groups. The discussion begins with a perspective within egalitarian liberalism, specifically Erin Kelly's (2023) view. This author asserts the need to pay particular attention to the histories of domination and discrimination suffered by certain groups when formulating principles of justice. In my view, such considerations are relevant, but the proper place to address them is not at the level of basic principles of justice. Instead, I propose that these considerations should be inserted at the next stage of reasoning about justice, i.e., when abstract principles are applied to real-world conditions. However, when reasoning about basic principles of justice, it is important to acknowledge that a fair cultural environment is a primary good. As a consequence, the right to a fair cultural environment must be included among the basic principles of justice (Watson & Hartley, 2018). My next question is whether concepts such as insult and cultural appropriation are relevant when shaping a fair cultural environment. My answer is negative for two reasons: (i) the traditional Millian argument that many people feel insulted merely by the fact that others disagree with them; (ii) policies designed to protect from insult lead to an unfair distribution of liberty, favoring intolerant individuals. Regarding cultural appropriation, I criticize those proposals that, despite their emancipatory intent, inadvertently replicate conservative worldviews that unfairly limit the freedom of individuals, including those members of vulnerable groups who are purportedly the ones to be protected. Specifically, I criticize two components of the "cultural appropriation emancipatory strategy": (i) the distinction between situations where a person realizes their "true" identity and other conditions; (ii) the prohibition of identifying with only certain aspects of a culture while avoiding others.

Keywords: cultural appropriation, culturally fair environment, egalitarian liberalism.



Filip Grgić, Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb

Truth and Action

Miščević's 1988 book *Radnja i objašnjenje (Action and Explanation)* fits squarely within the Davidsonian approach to action theory that defined the 1980s. In it, he argues that the first phase of analytic philosophy of action—whose key figures include Ludwig Wittgenstein, Elizabeth Anscombe, and Georg Henrik von Wright—has come to an end, primarily due to its neglect of empirical research and its reliance on an a priori model of explanation. In response, he develops a robust realist theory in which core concepts are grounded in a firmly naturalistic framework. Since the 2000s, however, there has been a strong resurgence of interest in the Anscombean account of action, which Miščević did not engage with in his later works. In my talk, I will explore one of the central concepts of this approach—the notion of practical truth—and contrast it with Miščević's realist perspective.

Keywords: action, Anscombe, description, Miščević, practical knowledge, practical truth.

Friderik Klampfer, University of Maribor

The True Remedy of War: From Individual to Institutional Pacifism ... and Back

Nenad's philosophical interest in war was never merely theoretical. As a victim of and a witness to the horrors of war in Croatia and neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina, his quest for the solution to the problem of ongoing and ever-recurring war was also deeply personal. Thus, it is surprising to learn that, setting aside his more popular writings, he dedicated just one article to this topic. However, since it does exhibit Nenad's brilliance in bringing together disparate lines of thought and engaging with historical figures like they were our contemporaries, it is worth delving into. My paper has three parts: a positive, a negative, and a reconciliatory one. It starts by assessing the reasons Nenad gives for our collective duty to stop all wars and finding these reasons compelling. In the second, more critical part, it reconstructs and evaluates Nenad's case in favor of institutional and against individual pacifism as a cure for war and finds it wanting. The concluding part explains why we need both and provides a sketch of how opposing war at both the institutional and personal levels may reinforce each other.

Keywords: philosophy of war, anti-war ethics, pacifism, individual pacifism, collective pacifism.



István Bodnár, Eötvös University, Budapest and Central European University, Vienna

Aristotle: Some Beginnings

In this talk, I will concentrate on Aristotle's considerations about two key analytical tools, predication and inference. During this discussion, I will present how the claims of the Categories are connected to considerations on which the argumentative strategies of the Topics rest. Through this, we will be able to put in sharper relief Aristotle's move, which elevates individual substances to the status of fundamental items in his account of what entities there are. This comparison between the Categories and the Topics will also bear upon what status is assigned in the Categories to species and genera of substances, restricting their claim to be substances without further qualification.

Keywords: Aristotle, Categories, Topics, substance, predication, inference.

Majda Trobok, University of Rijeka

How Do We Know Anything About Numbers? – In Honor of Nenad Mišćević

The talk is a critical analysis of Nenad Mišćević's theory about the way we come to grasp the notion of equinumerosity and of natural numbers. Mišćević endorses the view that the whole process is based on our intuitions, which apparently have their weaknesses and hence must be analyzed more closely.

Keywords: the process of grasping, equinumerosity, natural number, intuition, Nenad Mišćević.



Martin Justin, University of Maribor

Borut Trpin, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy LMU München and University of Maribor

Coherence, Belief Updating, and Epistemic Luck: A Computational Exploration

In his work on epistemic luck, Nenad Miščević argued that traditional modal definitions of luck fail to account for the instability of cognitive functioning in a priori domains, proposing instead an agent-centered approach that emphasizes the role of cognitive virtues in minimizing luck. Following his advice that “[t]he reflective luck can be minimized by using a coherentist strategy at the reflective level” (Miščević 2007, p. 67), this paper explores how coherence considerations can mitigate the effects of epistemic luck in belief updating, particularly in the face of noisy or misleading evidence. We present a novel computational framework that examines the role of coherence in belief formation and revision. Using Bayesian networks as a model of ground truth, we simulate agents who update their beliefs based on noisy or biased evidence, comparing the performance of “coherentist” agents (who filter evidence based on coherence measures) with “normal” agents (who update without coherence constraints). Our results show that coherence considerations can improve belief accuracy in highly noisy environments, even when agents start with relatively inaccurate priors. However, in less noisy environments, coherence can hinder inquiry by making agents overly cautious. This framework extends Miščević’s concerns about agent stability and epistemic luck to computational epistemology, addressing an open issue in Bayesian epistemology: how should one determine priors, and to what extent do they predetermine the outcome of belief updating? We investigate whether coherence considerations—as a potential cognitive virtue—can guide the selection and revision of priors, and under what conditions they prove beneficial. Our findings highlight the complex interplay between individual cognitive virtues and the dynamics of belief updating, particularly in contexts where agents interact within structured social networks.

Keywords: epistemic luck, computational epistemology, coherence, belief updating, agent stability.

Matjaž Potrč, University of Ljubljana

Memories of Nenad: Paris, Semantics, and Shared Intellectual Pursuits

My relationship with Nenad was profound and multifaceted. This presentation will highlight key memories of our time together, beginning with our impactful encounter in Paris and the subsequent resonance that led to years of collaboration. We delved deeply into semantic questions, such as communication-intention and referential roles, which later influenced my work on definite descriptions. Our discussions extended to a broader philosophical context, engaging with prominent thinkers of the time in Rijeka, Ljubljana, Zadar, and at the Kirchberg am Wechsel Wittgenstein symposia. Nenad’s support was instrumental in my academic journey, including teaching positions in Zagreb and Zadar, where I fostered further intellectual exchange.

Keywords: Paris, collaboration, semantics, teaching, discussions, intellectual community.



Miljana Milojević, University of Belgrade

Rationality and Extended Cognition

In his 2000 book *Rationality and Cognition*, Nenad Mišćević defended naturalistic rationalism against relativist critiques informed by connectionist cognitive science. Namely, connectionism, which seeks explanations of cognitive phenomena in neural mechanisms, challenges key assumptions of symbolic cognitive science, such as the existence of symbolic representations, sentence-like mental vehicles of content and rule-governed cognitive processes; consequently, these naturalistic results put into jeopardy the main tenets of classical epistemology, such as rationality of epistemic subjects and the existence of a unique cognitive strategy as truth-acquisition. These insights, in turn, led to the relativistic view, where cognitive strategies are seen as too diverse and incomparable. Mišćević argued that we can accept the results of cognitive science and neuroscience, but not the relativistic conclusion at the same time. Instead, we can still make room for truth, or a truth-related concept, to be the goal of our different cognitive strategies. In this presentation, I aim to reevaluate naturalistic assumptions about cognition from an Extended Cognition perspective, which does not take only neural mechanisms as constitutive of cognition. I will focus on the role of material symbols in cognitive transformation and aim to reinforce Mišćević's argument.

Keywords: rationality, connectionism, extended cognition, material symbols.

Mitja Sardoč, University of Ljubljana

The Moral Quandaries of Just War Rationality: A Rejoinder to Nenad

This paper takes a closer look at some of the most pressing quandaries, dilemmas, and other challenges that contemporary accounts of just war theory have faced. Based on Nenad Mišćević's analysis of just war rationality in his article "The Dilemmas of Just War and the Institutional Pacifism," this paper aims to reassess the main distinguishing characteristics of its moral calculus. In particular, it challenges just war theory as an impartial evaluative framework for the moral justification of military conflicts.

The introductory part identifies the most salient "internal tensions" in just war theory (led by the main changes and alterations advanced by the revisionists' account of just war) and "external pressures" (including emerging forms of unconventional warfare, e.g. asymmetric warfare, terrorism and violent extremism, soft wars etc.). The central part reassesses the constituent principles, moral requirements, and commitments of just war rationality and its moral calculus, including the moral equality of combatants, the requirement of proportionality, the principle of discrimination (distinction between combatants and noncombatants), etc. The concluding part challenges the binary character of the dichotomy between just and unjust wars that limits our understanding of the moral justification of warfare and its incapacity to prevent wars.

Keywords: just and unjust wars, just war rationality, belligerent justice, impartiality.



Mojca Küplen, University of Tennessee

Therapeutic Self-knowledge in Narrative Art

In recent years, there have been debates in aesthetics and philosophy of art on the question of whether we can acquire knowledge about the world from works of art. However, little has been written on the effects that art has on cultivating self-knowledge and self-development. While for most of us, it seems obvious that art has these effects, little is known about how and why these effects occur. Addressing this issue is the main aim of this paper. The gist of the argument is that narrative art provides a unique opportunity to adopt a dual (first- and third-personal) perspective on the self, which has recently been argued by psychologists and philosophers of mind to be necessary for obtaining the kind of self-knowledge that leads to self-development and self-change, i.e., therapeutic self-knowledge.

Keywords: self-knowledge, narrative art, fiction, mental simulation, emotions, dual perspective on the self.

Mylan Engel, Northern Illinois University

Armchair Epistemology: Nenad on Knowledge and Armchair Veritic Luck

In his underappreciated article “Armchair Luck,” Nenad argues that Pritchard’s safe-true-belief anti-luck epistemology cannot rule out a priori veritic luck. Since a priori necessary truths are true in all possible worlds, Pritchard’s safety condition is satisfied in clear cases of knowledge-destroying a priori veritic luck. Thus, Pritchard’s modal anti-luck epistemology is mistaken. Nenad’s diagnosis is that Pritchard puts too much focus on the world and not enough focus on the epistemic agent. The solution, according to Nenad, is a strong virtue-based epistemology that puts the focus on the epistemic agent. While I agree with Nenad’s decisive refutation of Pritchard’s anti-luck epistemology, I disagree with his diagnosis. The problem lies with Pritchard’s modal account of veritic luck. The kind of veritic luck that is incompatible with knowledge is the sort of evidence-based veritic luck that I identified when I originally introduced the distinction between evidential luck and veritic luck. Once that is recognized, we can see that there are two reliability constraints on knowledge: S’s reasons need to be reliable-indicator reasons, and S needs to be a reliable interpreter of those reasons. While Nenad is right to recognize the important role played by the epistemic agent, virtuous epistemic agency is not enough. The would-be knower also needs the right kind of reasons.

Keywords: Nenad Miščević, veritic luck, anti-luck epistemology, armchair luck, virtue epistemology.



Nenad Smokrović, University of Rijeka

Nenad on Graded Rationality

In a number of papers, Nenad formulated an idea of rationality that comes in gradations. This rather intuitive idea can be upgraded with the corresponding underlying logic. Namely, since theoretical rationality is understood as belief revision according to the (logical) rules, the process of revision of beliefs that avoids logical omniscience needs a suitable logic. I am proposing neighborhood semantics in dynamic interpretation as a suitable logic that supports this idea.

Keywords: rationality, neighborhood semantics, dynamic logic.

Olga Markič, University of Ljubljana

Nenad Miščević on Philosophy of Cognitive Science

It has been almost 30 years since Nenad Miščević and I wrote an introduction to philosophy of psychology titled Fizično in psihično. Miščević proposed the word “psihično” after Rudolph Carnap’s usage of “das Physische,” instead of the word “duh” that was more in use as a Slovene term for the English term “mind.” He thought it provided a better and more neutral start to the debate. The central part was dedicated to the most general questions about the nature of the mind and the relations between the mental and the physical (mind-body problem), but it also tackled the questions related to the philosophy of cognitive science that were prominent at that time. My aim in this paper is to reflect on the proposed questions and solutions in the light of new empirical knowledge from neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and artificial intelligence, a kind of imaginary debate with Nenad.

Keywords: Nenad Miščević, philosophy of cognitive science, mind-body problem, folk psychology, explanatory gap, intentionality.



Pierre Jacob, Paris, CNRS - The French National Centre for Scientific Research

Metarepresentational intuitions

Ever since the discussion of Premack and Woodruff's (1978) paper, most psychologists have taken false-belief attribution as the hallmark of mental state attribution (or mentalizing). To attribute a mental state to oneself or another is to form a higher-order belief about one's own or another's first-order mental state (e.g., belief). The developmental investigation of the capacity for false-belief attribution in human childhood has given rise to discrepant experimental findings according to whether the evidence is based on verbal or non-verbal false-belief tests. I propose to reconcile the discrepant evidence by taking findings based on non-verbal tests as reliable evidence that infants are able to attribute false beliefs to others and provide a tentative pragmatic explanation of the failure of most preschoolers on verbal false-belief tasks. Although the content of an agent's false belief logically clashes with the content of the attributor's true belief or knowledge of the relevant fact, I will argue that resolving the logical conflict between the content of the attributed belief and the content of the attributor's knowledge is not a necessary condition for false-belief attribution. Nor must the attributor inhibit the content of her own knowledge or true belief in the attribution process. All the attributor needs to do is to entertain the content of the agent's false belief. To echo one of Nenad Miščević's theses about linguistic intuitions, I will argue that what the developmental psychological investigation of mentalizing of the past forty or so years has shown is that humans (including human infants) have metarepresentational intuitions about the contents and attitudes of others' beliefs.

Keywords: mentalizing, metarepresentation, false-belief attribution, entertaining, intuition.

Simon Rippon, Central European University, Vienna

On Seriousness in Ethics and Metaphysics

Nenad Miščević (2004) endorsed modal explanationism—the view that modal truths influence empirically observable phenomena—as a way of defending the reliability of modal intuition and, by extension, the possibility of modal knowledge. Against an alternative empiricist view of modal knowledge that I am attracted to, conventionalism, he complained that “If concepts come for cheap, then they cannot ground metaphysically serious principles” (2004, p. 65). While Nenad did not explain what he meant by “metaphysically serious” principles, the complaint seems strikingly similar to the common complaint of metaethical Platonists that constructivism or conventionalism in metaethics—a view I have defended—cannot ground moral normativity (as these Platonists might have said: such views are not “normatively serious”). In this talk, I will investigate different things that might be meant by “serious” and some ways in which conventionalism in ethics and in metaphysics can or cannot be “serious.”

Keywords: conventionalism, modality, metaethics, knowledge.



Slobodan Perović, University of Belgrade

Speculative Philosophical and Scientific Goals: Computer Simulations and Thought Experiments

The reluctance to engage in speculative philosophical inquiry is partly driven by prevailing deflationary views of thought experiments. Typically contrasted with physical experiments, thought experiments are rarely employed in a speculative, projective sense, now common in science. Instead, they are primarily used to illustrate assumptions, test their logical consequences, or as “intuition pumps”. The latter rarely establish strong connections to relevant scientific research that could lend greater depth and plausibility to speculative endeavors. Philosophers of science can contribute to speculative inquiry in science and philosophy by combining thought experiments with computer simulations. This tool can be particularly valuable in addressing philosophical questions about the origin and nature of life. Such questions extend into the deep past but also into the future, exploring how life may have originated, what alternative forms it might have taken, and what kinds of life could be artificially created or discovered on other planets. This speculative exploration requires imaginative models that push conceptual boundaries, integrating both formal and concrete (biochemical and molecular) frameworks. A similar methodological approach could also be fruitfully applied in the philosophy of cosmology, as well as in various studies of societies.

Keywords: thought experiments, philosophy of science, computer simulations, origin of life, cosmology.

Tadej Todorović, University of Maribor

Janez Bregant, University of Maribor

Sacrificing Natural Kinds: Fodor’s Legacy and the Unity of Science

The article reevaluates Jerry Fodor’s key argument for the autonomy of special sciences, which rests on the notion of multiple realization and the claim that special science predicates must be natural kinds. After the outline of how Fodor’s view was shaped by the “syntactic” conception of scientific theories, it shows that the recent “semantic” approach in scientific theories challenges the idea that special science kinds must be natural and ontologically committing. On the semantic account, scientific models often invoke idealized or domain-specific predicates that do not have to be natural. We use Fodor’s own example – Gresham’s law – to articulate such a semantic perspective that preserves the unity of science: higher-level explanations can remain useful, real, and relatively autonomous also without irreducible natural kinds. By “sacrificing” natural kinds, we retain the explanatory powers of special sciences, create a simpler ontological picture of the world, and justify the modus operandi of sciences, such as cognitive science, where knowledge from different levels or disciplines that constitute it informs and refines our overall understanding of the world.

Keywords: multiple realization, natural kinds, unity of science, special sciences, Fodor.



Vojislav Božičković, University of Belgrade

Inference and Reference

It has been claimed that violations of the transparency of thought-contents blur the distinction between errors of reasoning and errors of fact, for which reason a view that violates transparency should be rejected. In showing that the given distinction can be blurred even when thought-content is transparent, I will argue that it needs to be transparent so as to fulfill the purposes for which we ascribe it to a subject. In not being involved in blurring this distinction, it makes it the case that in erring in her reasoning, the subject does not act irrationally. In taking issue with some prominent Frege-inspired views, I focus on those cases in which the subject confuses the same perceived object for two different ones, as well as two different objects for a single one.

Keywords: inference, reference, transparency, thought-content, irrationality.

Vojko Strahovnik, University of Ljubljana

The Structure of Epistemic Virtuousness

Within the field of virtue epistemology, one question that gets addressed is the question about the structure of epistemic virtue. As part of this inquiry, certain epistemic virtues, such as integrity or inquisitiveness, are bestowed a central role of meta-virtue or some sort of organizing virtue. This paper examines these questions and proposes a perspective that includes an interplay between core epistemic virtuousness and ancillary epistemic virtues, underscoring their respective roles in rational belief fixation. Building on prior work, the author explores the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of epistemic rationality and its layered structure. Within such a framework, core virtuousness remains central to rational belief fixation across time, while ancillary virtues, being context-specific, enhance alignment within the epistemic hierarchy. Ancillary epistemic virtues enhance belief formation processes, improve the inter-level calibration of core virtues, and allow epistemic agents to pursue epistemic ends beyond the truth.

Keywords: virtues, epistemic virtuousness, rationality, truth, evidence, epistemic evaluation.

“Rada bi ti povedal, da ...”

